Mixing E-mail with Babel
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Increasingly large numbers of people communicate today via electronic means such as email or news forums. One of the basic properties of the current electronic communication means is the identification of the end-points. However, at times it is desirable or even critical to hide the identity and/or whereabouts of the end-points (e.g., human users) involved. This paper discusses the goals and desired properties of anonymous email in general and introduces the design and salient features of Babel anonymous remailer. Babel allows email users to converse electronically while remaining anonymous with respect to each other and to other-even hostile-parties. A range of attacks and corresponding countermeasures is considered. An attempt is made to formalize and quantify certain dimensions of anonymity and untraceable communication.
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Citations
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DSSS-Based Flow Marking Technique for Invisible Traceback
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“tem remailer by Helsingius [11], cypherpunk remailer by Eric Hughes and Hal Finney [28], Babel by Gülcü and Tsudik [29] and Mixmaster by Cottrell [30].”
BackgroundJakobsson, M. (1998) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/bfb0054145 · Cited by 181
“If several such servers are pipelined for improved privacy (such as in [14, 23, 31]), this raises concerns in terms of both correctness and availability of service, especially in situations where mix servers are welcome targets of attackers.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Gulcu, C., & Tsudik, G.
- Venue
- Proceedings of Internet Society Symposium on Network and Distributed Systems Security
- Publisher
- IEEE Comput. Soc. Press
- Published
- 2002-12-23
- Pages
- 2-16
- OpenAlex
- W1894333397
- Cited by
- 302
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 19.57
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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