Towards Robust Low Cost Authentication for Pervasive Devices
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Abstract
Low cost devices such as RFIDs, sensor network nodes, and smartcards are crucial for building the next generation pervasive and ubiquitous networks. The inherent power and footprint limitations of such networks, prevent us from employing standard cryptographic techniques for authentication which were originally designed to secure high end systems with abundant power. Furthermore, the sharp increase in the number, diversity and strength of physical attacks which directly target the implementation may have devastating consequences in a network setting creating a single point of failure. A compromised node may leak a master key, or may give the attacker an opportunity for injecting faulty messages. In this paper we present a lightweight challenge response authentication scheme based on noisy physical unclonable functions (PUF) that allows for extremely efficient implementations. Furthermore, the inherent properties of PUFs provide cryptographically strong tamper resilience. In a network setting this means that a tampered device will no longer authenticate and in a sense will be isolated from the network.
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Cited by
Modeling attacks on physical unclonable functions
Rührmair, U., Sehnke, F., Sölter, J., Dror, G., Devadas, S., & Schmidhuber, J. (2010) · Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1866307.1866335 · Cited by 1,021
PUF Modeling Attacks on Simulated and Silicon Data
Ruhrmair, U., Solter, J., Sehnke, F., Xu, X., Mahmoud, A., Stoyanova, V., Dror, G., Schmidhuber, J., Burleson, W., & Devadas, S. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2013.2279798 · Cited by 637
Physically Unclonable Functions: A Study on the State of the Art and Future Research Directions
Maes, R., & Verbauwhede, I. (2010) · Information Security and Cryptography · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14452-3_1 · Cited by 469
Lightweight and Privacy-Preserving Two-Factor Authentication Scheme for IoT Devices
Gope, P., & Sikdar, B. (2019) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2846299 · Cited by 378
Chatterjee, U., Govindan, V., Sadhukhan, R., Mukhopadhyay, D., Chakraborty, R. S., Mahata, D., & Prabhu, M. M. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2018.2832201 · Cited by 290
Katzenbeisser, S., Kocabaş, Ü., Rožić, V., Sadeghi, A.-R., Verbauwhede, I., & Wachsmann, C. (2012) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_17 · Cited by 254
Physical Unclonable Functions in the Internet of Things: State of the Art and Open Challenges
Babaei, A., & Schiele, G. (2019) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s19143208 · Cited by 168
Metadata
- Authors
- Ozturk, E., Hammouri, G., & Sunar, B.
- Venue
- 2008 Sixth Annual IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2008-03
- Pages
- 170-178
- ISSN
- 2474-249X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2114337476
- Cited by
- 111
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 3.94
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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