An intrusion and defense testbed in a cyber-power system environment
Abstract
The proposed testbed of the cyber-power system consists of power system simulation, substation automation, and the SCADA system. Scenarios for substation cyber security intrusions and anomaly detection concepts have been proposed. An attack tree method can be used to identify vulnerable substations and intrusions through remote access points. Specific substation vulnerability scenarios have been tested. Temporal anomaly is determined by data and information acquired at different time points. This is a metric to determine the anomaly between two snapshots. In a distributed intrusion detection algorithm, distributed agents are trained with a large number of scenarios and intended for real-time applications. In a distributed environment, if an anomaly is detected by one agent, it is able to distribute critical information to other agents in the network.
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Real-time monitoring, pay-per-use, licenses, and cheaper capital and operating expense are advantages offered by cloud service.
“Real-time monitoring, Pay-per-use, licenses, cheaper capital and operating expense are the advantages offered by cloudservice [126].”
From Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review (2021) · cites this paper as [126]
Cites
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Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review
Yadav, G., & Paul, K. (2021) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2021.100433 · Cited by 261 · see citing works
- Authors
- Hong, J., Wu, S.-S., Stefanov, A., Fshosha, A., Liu, C.-C., Gladyshev, P., & Govindarasu, M.
- Affiliations
- University College Dublin (IE)
- Iowa State University (US)
- Venue
- 2011 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2011-07
- Pages
- 1-5
- ISSN
- 1932-5517 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2104587665
- Cited by
- 47
- References
- 9
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 4
- FWCI
- 4.28
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Science Foundation Ireland
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power System Optimization and Stability
- Keywords
- intrusion detection, anomaly detection, attack trees, temporal anomalies, distributed intrusion detection, distributed agents, SCADA, substation automation, power system simulation, testbed
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