Taxonomy of firmware Trojans in smart grid devices
Abstract
The modernization of the electric grid, utilizing advances in information technologies, has uncovered opportunities for improved communication and efficiency of power systems. While this smart grid environment offers significant economic and reliability benefits, it has also divulged a substantial range of cyber attack issues. Attacks on embedded microprocessor-based devices, like Stuxnet, have demonstrated that the firmware of control equipment can be susceptible to security breaches able to cause great damage to the system. Despite the numerous studies on power systems security, researchers do not have a representative set of benchmarks and taxonomy classes to be able to develop proper detection and mitigation strategies against such attacks. To this end, we provide a taxonomy for firmware Trojans and develop firmware Trojan benchmark cases for four devices commonly found in smart grid deployments.
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Hardware Trojan attacks are malicious modifications of electronic hardware at various stages of its operation and can lead to control interference and leaking of secret data.
“Additionally, hardware Trojan attacks refer to malicious modifications of electronic hardware at various stages of its operation. These attacks are a serious security concern for the electronics industry as they can lead to control interference and the leaking of secret data.”
From Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure. (2023) · cites this paper as [64]
Hardware Trojan attacks require the adversary to have physical access to the integrated circuits.
“It requires the adversary to have physical access to the integrated circuits [63,64].”
From Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure. (2023) · cites this paper as [64]
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References 8 · Cited by 25
- Authors
- Konstantinou, C., Keliris, A., & Maniatakos, M.
- Affiliations
- New York University Abu Dhabi (AE)
- Venue
- 2016 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2016-07
- Pages
- 1-5
- ISSN
- 1932-5517 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2551324906
- Cited by
- 25
- References
- 8
- Citations by year
- 2025: 5 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 3.17
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Keywords
- smart grid security, Stuxnet, malware detection
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