Model Inversion Attacks for Prediction Systems: Without Knowledge of Non-Sensitive Attributes
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
While online services based on machine learning (ML) have been attracting considerable attention in both academic and business, privacy issues are becoming a threat that cannot be ignored. Recently, Fredrikson et al. [USENIX 2014] proposed a new paradigm of model inversion attacks, which allows an adversary to expose the sensitive information of users by using an ML system for an unintended purpose. In particular, the attack reveals the sensitive attribute values of the target user by using their non-sensitive attributes and the output of the ML model. Here, for the attack to succeed, the adversary needs to possess the non-sensitive attribute values of the target user prior to the attack. However, in reality, even if this information (i.e., non-sensitive attributes) is not necessarily information the user regards as sensitive, it may be difficult for the adversary to actually acquire it. In this paper, we propose a general model inversion (GMI) framework to capture the above scenario where knowledge of the non-sensitive attributes is not necessarily provided. Here, our framework also captures the scenario of Fredrikson et al. Notably, we generalize the paradigm of Fredrikson et al. by additionally modeling the amount of auxiliary information the adversary possesses at the time of the attack. Our proposed GMI framework enables a new type of model inversion attack for prediction systems, which can be carried out without knowledge of the non-sensitive attributes. At a high level, we use the paradigm of data poisoning in a novel way and inject malicious data into the set of training data to modify the ML model into a target ML model, which we can attack without having to have knowledge of the non-sensitive attributes. Our new attack enables the inference of sensitive attributes in the user input from only the output of the ML model, even when the non-sensitive attributes of the user are not available to the adversary. Finally, we provide a concrete algorithm of our model inversion attack on prediction systems based on linear regression models, and give a detailed description of how the data poisoning algorithm is constructed.We evaluate the performance of our new model inversion attack without the knowledge of non-sensitive attributes through experiments with actual data sets.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Amazon.com recommendations: item-to-item collaborative filtering
Linden, G., Smith, B., & York, J. (2003) · IEEE Internet Computing · doi:10.1109/mic.2003.1167344 · Cited by 5,403
Poisoning Attacks against Support Vector Machines
Biggio, B., Nelson, B., & Laskov, P. (2012) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1206.6389 · Cited by 1,331
Huang, L., Joseph, A. D., Nelson, B., Rubinstein, B. I. P., & Tygar, J. D. (2011) · Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Security and artificial intelligence · doi:10.1145/2046684.2046692 · Cited by 1,194
Lowd, D., & Meek, C. (2005) · Proceedings of the eleventh ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery in data mining · doi:10.1145/1081870.1081950 · Cited by 755
Towards Making Systems Forget with Machine Unlearning
Cao, Y., & Yang, J. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.35 · Cited by 622 · cited 1×
“[26] proposed a poisoning approach on ML models, where data are not maliciously injected, but rather intendedly removed from the training data.”
BackgroundData poisoning attacks on factorization-based collaborative filtering
Li, B., Wang, Y., Singh, A., & Vorobeychik, Y. (2016) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1608.08182 · Cited by 235
Cited by
The Secret Revealer: Generative Model-Inversion Attacks Against Deep Neural Networks
Zhang, Y., Jia, R., Pei, H., Wang, W., Li, B., & Song, D. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1911.07135 · Cited by 465
The Secret Revealer: Generative Model-Inversion Attacks Against Deep Neural Networks
Zhang, Y., Jia, R., Pei, H., Wang, W., Li, B., & Song, D. (2020) · 2020 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) · doi:10.1109/cvpr42600.2020.00033 · Cited by 449
A Survey of Privacy Attacks in Machine Learning
Rigaki, M., & Garcia, S. (2024) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3624010 · Cited by 285
“Name Data Type Learning Task Reference(s) Size (Samples) 538 Steak Survey [37] mixed features multi-class classification [14, 24, 38, 109] 332 AT&T Faces [4] images multi-class classification [24, 42, 119] 400 Bank Marketing [21] mixed features multi-class classification [116] 45,210 Bitcoin prices time series regress…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe Threat of Offensive AI to Organizations
Mirsky, Y., Demontis, A., Kotak, J., Shankar, R., Gelei, D., Yang, L., Zhang, X., Pintor, M., Lee, W., Elovici, Y., et al. (2023) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2022.103006 · Cited by 97
Survey: Leakage and Privacy at Inference Time
Jegorova, M., Kaul, C., Mayor, C., O'Neil, A. Q., Weir, A., Murray-Smith, R., & Tsaftaris, S. A. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence · doi:10.1109/tpami.2022.3229593 · Cited by 77
Metadata
- Authors
- Hidano, S., Murakami, T., Katsumata, S., Kiyomoto, S., & Hanaoka, G.
- Venue
- 2017 15th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2017-08
- Pages
- 115-11509
- OpenAlex
- W2895805829
- Cited by
- 72
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 1.78
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Model Inversion Attacks for Prediction Systems: Without Knowledge of Non-Sensitive Attributes. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/pst.2017.00023
- The paper
- Hidano, S., Murakami, T., Katsumata, S., Kiyomoto, S., & Hanaoka, G. (2017). Model Inversion Attacks for Prediction Systems: Without Knowledge of Non-Sensitive Attributes. 2017 15th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST). https://doi.org/10.1109/pst.2017.00023
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.