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Cited by 285

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

A game theoretic framework for incentives in P2P systems

Open access
Buragohain, C., Agrawal, D., Suri, S.·2004·Proceedings Third International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P2003)
DOI 10.1109/ptp.2003.1231503
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Abstract

Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. We use ideas from game theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance.

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Crossref · 10.1109/ptp.2003.1231503

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Metadata

Authors
Buragohain, C., Agrawal, D., & Suri, S.
Venue
Proceedings Third International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P2003)
Publisher
IEEE Comput. Soc
Published
2004-03-01
Pages
48-56
DOI
10.1109/ptp.2003.1231503
OpenAlex
W2110205132
Cited by
285
References
8
FWCI
15.54
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A game theoretic framework for incentives in P2P systems. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/ptp.2003.1231503
The paper
Buragohain, C., Agrawal, D., & Suri, S. (2004). A game theoretic framework for incentives in P2P systems. Proceedings Third International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P2003). https://doi.org/10.1109/ptp.2003.1231503

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.