An innovative Goddard Space Flight Center methodology for using FMECA as a risk assessment and communication tool
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Abstract
Functional and Interface Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analyses (FMECA) investigate the following types of detailed potential failure origin and failure impact questions: i) What interfaces dependencies or performance issues exist as a result of each potential functional failure or input loss? ii) If a component fails or exhibits intermittent functionality, is a redundant component available to mitigate the failure effects? iii) If a failure occurs internal to the component's electronics is there the potential for collateral damage of adjacent systems (i.e., Is propagation possible? Will a system failure "Do No Harm" to other systems?)? iv) Can any single failure mode of the instrument lead to total loss of science/data from the instrument or other flight systems? The answers to these questions help to identify Single Point Failures (SPFs), Critical Items, and have the potential to characterize and quantify risk if a risk assessment methodology is used throughout the FMECA process. The following FMECA risk assessment methodology has been developed by GSFC's Reliability and Risk Analysis Branch to assess and communicate failure risks: 1) Correlate Mission Success Requirements-to-GSFC Risk Management Consequence Definitions (GPR 7120.4D); 2) Correlate Failure Severities (NASA/GSFC FMECA Procedures)-to-GSFC Risk Management Consequence Definitions (GPR 7120.4D); 3) Correlate Mission Failure and Duration-to-GSFC Risk Management Likelihood Definitions (GPR 7120.4D); 4) Analyze and characterize each failure mode using these correlations; 5) Assess the Failure Modes as risks, and 6) Communicate risks to mission risk managers. This methodology has already been successfully used on the following NASA GSFC projects: ICESAT-2, OSIRIS-Rex, Robotic Refueling Mission (RRM), Gravity and Extreme Magnetism SMEX (GEMS), and Nuclear Spectroscopic Telescope Array (NuSTAR) to assess and communicate risks including single point failure risks based on FMECA results. Thus it can be considered valid and useable for other missions.
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“This feature, often referred to as detectability, has been widely discussed in traditional industrial domains, (e.g., [25-27]), with limited systematic aspects in space domain [19].”
From A Reliability Engineering Approach for Managing Risks in CubeSats (2018) · cites this paper as [19]
In the citing paper
“Therefore, the approach used in this study, extends ESA guidelines for functional FMECA, following the influence of the US satellite standard for FMECA-also documented in a recent FMECA space-based application [19]-in order to produce a three-dimensional risk index.”
From A Reliability Engineering Approach for Managing Risks in CubeSats (2018) · cites this paper as [19]
Citations
Cites
Untitled work
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(2013) · GSFC Single Point Failure (SPF) Policy GSFC Code 300 Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Engineer
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(2012)
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(0) · GSFC Flight Assurance Procedure P–302–720 (Rev –)
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(0) · Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements NASA NPR 8000 4A
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(0) · FMEA Info Centre
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(0) · Goddard Procedural Requirements for Risk Management Goddard Space Flight Center Code 300 GPR 7120 4D
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Cited by
Ciani, L., Guidi, G., & Patrizi, G. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2928120 · Cited by 75
A Reliability Engineering Approach for Managing Risks in CubeSats
Menchinelli, A., Ingiosi, F., Pamphili, L., Marzioli, P., Patriarca, R., Costantino, F., & Piergentili, F. (2018) · Aerospace · doi:10.3390/aerospace5040121 · Cited by 35
“…approach has to be conceived as an iterative process, in order to allow a back and forth analysis (from part to system levels, and vice versa) which also ensures that the detailed design still maintains the intended system architecture, in line with both design and reliability requirements.”
BackgroundFuzzy-Based Approach to Solve Classical Risk Priority Number Drawbacks for Railway Signaling Systems
Ciani, L., Guidi, G., & Patrizi, G. (2021) · IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Magazine · doi:10.1109/mits.2021.3121433 · Cited by 9
Chati, M., Hadef, H., Djebabra, M., & Chettouh, S. (2025) · Nuclear Technology · doi:10.1080/00295450.2025.2472576 · Cited by 1
“[28,29] A second trend is to attenuate RPN scores by either using a logarithmic scale [Eq.”
Lopes, I. D. C. (2020) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/5d0e7b80z8713z4fa6zae5azace84517c9b9 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Lindsey, N. J.
- Affiliations
- Goddard Space Flight Center (US)
- Corresponding author
- Lindsey, Nancy J
- Venue
- 2016 Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2016-01
- Pages
- 1-9
- ISSN
- 0149-144X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2340394100
- Cited by
- 5
- References
- 9
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 2.00
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Risk and Safety Analysis
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Reliability and Maintenance Optimization
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Systems Engineering Methodologies and Applications
- Keywords
- FMECA, risk assessment, risk communication, single point of failure, critical items, failure propagation, failure severity, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, spacecraft reliability, ICESat-2, OSIRIS-REx, gems, NuSTAR
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