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A Reliability Engineering Approach for Managing Risks in CubeSats

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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 14 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Besides large-scale space missions, the spread of CubeSats for a variety of applications is increasingly requiring the development of systematic approaches for risk management. Being these applications are based on components with low TRL (Technology Readiness Level) or with limited performance data, it is required to define approaches which ensure a systematic perspective. This paper aims to present a reliability engineering approach based on FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis) to manage CubeSat reliability data and prioritize criticalities early in the design phase. The approach firstly proposes an alpha-numeric coding system to support the identification and labeling of failure modes for typical CubeSats’ items. Subsequently, each FMECA coefficient (i.e., Severity, Occurrence, Detectability) has been linked to the CubeSat’s structural properties, reducing subjectivity by means of techno-centric proxy indicators. The approach has been validated in the design phases of a 6-Units university CubeSat for the observation of M-Dwarf stars and binary systems. The performed analysis supported the design process and allowed to identify the major criticalities of the CubeSat design, as demonstrated in the extended case study included in the paper. The formalized method could be applied to design procedures for nano-satellites, as well as being expanded for research and development in a variety of space missions.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper presents a five-step FMECA-based reliability engineering approach for CubeSats, adding an alpha-numeric failure coding system and a three-dimensional risk index (Occurrence, Severity, Detectability) rated 1–5. It applies the method to the preliminary design of the 6U SPEC CubeSat, identifying structural and payload-related criticalities and supporting design revisions.

Key findings

  • The proposed coding system uses a 5-part alphanumeric code, `XXX-A.B-CCC#DDDD`, to link failure modes to subsystems, effects, propagation, and specific fails.
  • Criticality analysis uses O, S, and D each rated 1–5; RPN = O × S × D, with thresholds: 1–24 no impact, 25–49 minor effects, 50–74 mission limitations, 75–99 major effects, 100–125 catastrophic. Occurrence inference used 150 IF-THEN combinations.
  • In the SPEC case study, maximum RPN per subsystem was: TT&C = 50, PLD = 60, THM = 75, EPS = 75, OBH = 75, ADC = 80, Interfaces = 80, STR = 100. Specific examples include STR-3.2 unseparated PLD adapter RPN = 100, STR-3.3-PLD-5 filters damaged RPN = 100, STR-3.4-PLD|THM RPN = 80, and EPS-3.2-ADC-1 RPN = 15.
  • The analysis led to design revisions to introduce redundancies where possible or adopt fault-tolerant strategies; highest RPN values related to non-redundant items whose failure jeopardized mission success.

Methods

  • Design: a five-step functional FMECA procedure—construct functional block diagrams; identify failure modes with coding; perform criticality analysis (O, S, D); rank failure modes via RPN; identify mitigation strategies. It integrates traditional FMECA and standards including GPR 7120.4A, MIL-STD-1629, ESA ECSS-Q-ST-30-02C, and SAE ARP5580.
  • Data/sample: applied to SPEC (Stellar Population Evolution on CubeSats), a 6U university CubeSat designed during the 2017 Spacecraft Design course at Sapienza University of Rome, aimed at observing M-Dwarf stars and binary systems; approximately 20 × 10 × 30 cm, with a Ritchey-Chrétien reflecting telescope, 40 solar cells giving maximum power generation of 31.3 W, and 40 Whr battery storage.
  • Analysis: semi-quantitative 1–5 indexes; Occurrence from failure probability and conditioned probabilities via fuzzy associative map IF-THEN rules; Detectability from falsifiability and observability via IF-THEN rules; RPN calculated as the product of O, S, and D against defined thresholds.

Limitations

  • Stated: subjectivity remains an open issue, especially in severity estimation; the coefficients are deterministic model abstractions with static values based on deterministic variables or estimated parameters, imprecisely known and inherently uncertain, raising epistemic uncertainty; future work suggested Bayesian theory or Petri nets.
  • Stated/evident: failure rate data for university CubeSat components are generally unavailable, so estimation relies on similar items or expert judgment; results are based on modeling assumptions and numerical coefficients that compensate for the lack of precise statistical data, mainly for layout rather than component selection.
  • Evident: the case study is the preliminary design (Phase 0–Phase A) of a university CubeSat, not flight validation; OBDH software failures were not considered because the design detail did not include actual software routines coded and tested.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3390/aerospace5040121

Cites

35 of 36 references verified0 citation errors · 1 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Figure 1 Logical scheme if inference rules for the FMECA index Occurrence (O). Figure 1. Logical scheme if inference rules for the FMECA index Occurrence (O).
Figure 1 Logical scheme if inference rules for the FMECA index Occurrence (O). Figure 1. Logical scheme if inference rules for the FMECA index Occurrence (O).CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 2 Logical scheme of inference rules for the Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) index Detectability (D). Figure 2. Logical scheme of inference rules for the Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) index Detectability (D).
Figure 2 Logical scheme of inference rules for the Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) index Detectability (D). Figure 2. Logical scheme of inference rules for the Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) index Detectability (D).CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 3 CubeSat sub-systems block diagram (dotted lines represent power lines, dashed-dotted lines represent data lines, bold dashed lines represent mechanical interfaces). UHF: Ultra-High Frequency; Figure 3. CubeSat sub-systems block diagram (dotted lines represent power lines, dashed-dotted lines represent data lines, bold dashed lines represent mechanical interfaces). UHF: Ultra-High Frequency; IMU: Inertial Measurement Unit.
Figure 3 CubeSat sub-systems block diagram (dotted lines represent power lines, dashed-dotted lines represent data lines, bold dashed lines represent mechanical interfaces). UHF: Ultra-High Frequency; Figure 3. CubeSat sub-systems block diagram (dotted lines represent power lines, dashed-dotted lines represent data lines, bold dashed lines represent mechanical interfaces). UHF: Ultra-High Frequency; IMU: Inertial Measurement Unit.CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 4 Spacecraft CAD model.
Figure 4 Spacecraft CAD model.CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 5 Example of the code used to identify the failures. Figure 5. Example of the code used to identify the failures.
Figure 5 Example of the code used to identify the failures. Figure 5. Example of the code used to identify the failures.CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 6 FMECA logical loop for STR. Figure 6. FMECA logical loop for STR.
Figure 6 FMECA logical loop for STR. Figure 6. FMECA logical loop for STR.CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 7 Distribution of RPN scores for each subsystem. Figure 7. Distribution of RPN scores for each subsystem.
Figure 7 Distribution of RPN scores for each subsystem. Figure 7. Distribution of RPN scores for each subsystem.CC-BY · From the PDF

Verification

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 36 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. 8. NASA. NASA/SP-2000-6110: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)-A Bibliography ; NASA: Washington, DC, USA, 2000. [CrossRef]
  2. 18. Bungo, S. Reliability Analysis of SWAMPSAT. Master's Thesis, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA, 2011; pp. 1-157.
  3. 38. Pellegrino, A.; Seitzer, P.; Piergentili, F.; Santoni, F.; Cutler, J.; Washabaugh, P.; Cardona, T.; Mazioli, P.; Cialone, G.; Lee, C.H.; et al. LEDSAT: In-orbit demonstration mission for LED-based cluster launch early identification and improved LEO surveillance. In Proceedings of the 68th International Astronautical Congress (IAC), Guadalajara, Mexico, 25-29 September 2017; Volume 6, pp. 4077-4091.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Menchinelli, A., Ingiosi, F., Pamphili, L., Marzioli, P., Patriarca, R., Costantino, F., & Piergentili, F.
Affiliations
Sapienza University of Rome (IT)
Corresponding author
Patriarca, Riccardo
Venue
Aerospace
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2018-11-15
Volume
5
Issue
4
Pages
121
ISSN
2226-4310 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2900745185
Cited by
35
References
35
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 2
FWCI
3.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Aerospace (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • IRIS Research product catalog (Sapienza University of Rome) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • Goddard Space Flight Center
  • Eurostars
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Aerospace Engineering › Spacecraft Design and Technology
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Reliability and Maintenance Optimization
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Risk and Safety Analysis
Keywords
CubeSat, reliability engineering, risk management, FMECA, failure mode identification, nanosatellites, binary star observations, design phase

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Reliability Engineering Approach for Managing Risks in CubeSats. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3390/aerospace5040121
The paper
Menchinelli, A., Ingiosi, F., Pamphili, L., Marzioli, P., Patriarca, R., Costantino, F., & Piergentili, F. (2018). A Reliability Engineering Approach for Managing Risks in CubeSats. Aerospace. https://doi.org/10.3390/aerospace5040121

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