The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Strand spaces: why is a security protocol correct?
Abstract
A strand is a sequence of events; it represents either the execution of an action by a legitimate party in a security protocol or else a sequence of actions by a penetrator. A strand space is a collection of strands, equipped with a graph structure generated by causal interaction. In this framework, protocol correctness claims may be expressed in terms of the connections between strands of different kinds. In this paper, we develop the notion of a strand space. We then prove a generally useful lemma, as a sample result giving a general bound on the abilities of the penetrator in any protocol. We apply the strand space formalism to prove the correctness of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol (G. Lowe, 1995, 1996). Our approach gives a detailed view of the conditions under which the protocol achieves authentication and protects the secrecy of the values exchanged. We also use our proof methods to explain why the original Needham-Schroeder (1978) protocol fails. We believe that our approach is distinguished from other work on protocol verification by the simplicity of the model and the ease of producing intelligible and reliable proofs of protocol correctness even without automated support.
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Citations
Cites
On the security of public key protocols
Dolev, D., & Yao, A. (1983) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1983.1056650 · Cited by 5,833
Burrows, M., Abadi, M., & Needham, R. (1990) · ACM Transactions on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/77648.77649 · Cited by 2,523
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Needham, R. M., & Schroeder, M. D. (1978) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/359657.359659 · Cited by 2,362
Isabelle: A Generic Theorem Prover
Paulson, L. C., & Nipkow, T. (1994) · Cited by 926
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Paulson, L. C. (1998) · Journal of Computer Security · doi:10.3233/jcs-1998-61-205 · Cited by 898
Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol using FDR
Lowe, G. (1996) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-61042-1_43 · Cited by 872
The Inductive Approach to Verifying Cryptographic Protocols
Paulson, L. C. (1998) · Cited by 836
Timestamps in key distribution protocols
Denning, D. E., & Sacco, G. M. (1981) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/358722.358740 · Cited by 682
An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
Lowe, G. (1995) · Information Processing Letters · doi:10.1016/0020-0190(95)00144-2 · Cited by 647
Burrows, M., Abadi, M., & Needham, R. (1989) · Proceedings of the twelfth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles · doi:10.1145/74850.74852 · Cited by 641
Cited by
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
Abadi, M., & Fournet, C. (2001) · Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/360204.360213 · Cited by 846
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)*
Abadi, M., & Rogaway, P. (2002) · Journal of Cryptology · doi:10.1007/s00145-001-0014-7 · Cited by 613
Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis
Millen, J., & Shmatikov, V. (2001) · Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/501983.502007 · Cited by 317
The Modelling and Analysis of Security Protocols: the CSP Approach
Ryan, P. Y. A., Schneider, S. A., Goldsmith, M., Lowe, G., & Roscoe, A. (2001) · doi:10.25405/ncl.34123404 · Cited by 269
A modular correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS
He, C., Sundararajan, M., Datta, A., Derek, A., & Mitchell, J. C. (2005) · Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1102120.1102124 · Cited by 121
Injective synchronisation: An extension of the authentication hierarchy
Cremers, C. J. F., Mauw, S., & de Vink, E. P. (2006) · Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2006.08.034 · Cited by 61
Metadata
- Authors
- Fabrega, F. J. T., Herzog, J. C., & Guttman, J. D.
- Venue
- Proceedings. 1998 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Cat. No.98CB36186)
- Publisher
- IEEE Comput. Soc
- Published
- 2002-11-27
- Pages
- 160-171
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2150426251
- Cited by
- 393
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 21.87
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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