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Cited by 204

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Using programmer-written compiler extensions to catch security holes

Ashcraft, K., Engler, D.·2005·Proceedings 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Abstract

This paper shows how system-specific static analysis can find security errors that violate rules such as "integers from untrusted sources must be sanitized before use" and "do not dereference user-supplied pointers." In our approach, programmers write system-specific extensions that are linked into the compiler and check their code for errors. We demonstrate the approach's effectiveness by using it to find over 100 security errors in Linux and OpenBSD, over 50 of which have led to kernel patches. An unusual feature of our approach is the use of methods to automatically detect when we miss code actions that should be checked.

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Metadata

Authors
Ashcraft, K., & Engler, D.
Venue
Proceedings 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Published
2005-08-25
Pages
143-159
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1600965014
Cited by
204
References
1
FWCI
17.89
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Using programmer-written compiler extensions to catch security holes. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/secpri.2002.1004368
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Ashcraft, K., & Engler, D. (2005). Using programmer-written compiler extensions to catch security holes. Proceedings 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/secpri.2002.1004368

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.