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A concrete security treatment of symmetric encryption

Bellare, M., Desai, A., Jokipii, E., Rogaway, P.·2002·Proceedings 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science

Abstract

We study notions and schemes for symmetric (ie. private key) encryption in a concrete security framework. We give four different notions of security against chosen plaintext attack and analyze the concrete complexity of reductions among them, providing both upper and lower bounds, and obtaining tight relations. In this way we classify notions (even though polynomially reducible to each other) as stronger or weaker in terms of concrete security. Next we provide concrete security analyses of methods to encrypt using a block cipher, including the most popular encryption method, CBC. We establish tight bounds (meaning matching upper bounds and attacks) on the success of adversaries as a function of their resources.

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Metadata

Authors
Bellare, M., Desai, A., Jokipii, E., & Rogaway, P.
Venue
Proceedings 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Published
2002-11-23
Pages
394-403
ISSN
0272-5428 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2139172211
Cited by
931
References
0
FWCI
32.08
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A concrete security treatment of symmetric encryption. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/sfcs.1997.646128
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Bellare, M., Desai, A., Jokipii, E., & Rogaway, P. (2002). A concrete security treatment of symmetric encryption. Proceedings 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1109/sfcs.1997.646128

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.