Cyber security in industrial control systems: Analysis of DoS attacks against PLCs and the insider effect
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are vital for countries' smart grids and critical infrastructures. In addition to the advantages such as controlling and monitoring geographically distributed structures, increasing productivity and efficiency, ICS have brought some security problems. Specific solutions are needed to be produced for these security issues. The most important information security component for ICS is availability and the most devastating threat to this component is Denial of Service (DoS) attack. For this reason, DoS attacks carried out on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), an important component of ICS, have been analyzed in the paper. In the test environment where attack scenarios were implemented, real PLC devices were used in order to get the most accurate results. The destructive effects of insiders, particularly in the case of cyber attacks against ICS, in bypassing the system security measure and discovery phase also emphasized in the paper.
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Cites
SCADA security in the light of cyber-warfare
Nicholson, A., Webber, S., Dyer, S., Patel, T., & Janicke, H. (2012) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2012.02.009 · Cited by 334
A testbed for secure and robust SCADA systems
Giani, A., Karsai, G., Roosta, T., Shah, A., Sinopoli, B., & Wiley, J. (2008) · ACM SIGBED Review · doi:10.1145/1399583.1399587 · Cited by 94
Experimental assessment of network design approaches for protecting industrial control systems
Genge, B., Graur, F., & Haller, P. (2015) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2015.07.005 · Cited by 36
Cited by
Nankya, M., Chataut, R., & Akl, R. (2023) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s23218840 · Cited by 114
A Design Approach to IoT Endpoint Security for Production Machinery Monitoring
Tedeschi, S., Emmanouilidis, C., Mehnen, J., & Roy, R. (2019) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s19102355 · Cited by 33
Potluri, S., Diedrich, C., Roy Nanduru, S. R., & Vasamshetty, K. (2019) · 2019 IEEE 17th International Conference on Industrial Informatics (INDIN) · doi:10.1109/indin41052.2019.8972171 · Cited by 8
“DoS against the ICS target the communication links or attempt to disable programs running on system endpoints which control the system, log data and govern communications [9].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Ylmaz, E. N., Ciylan, B., Gonen, S., Sindiren, E., & Karacayilmaz, G.
- Venue
- 2018 6th International Istanbul Smart Grids and Cities Congress and Fair (ICSG)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2018-04
- Pages
- 81-85
- OpenAlex
- W2842870959
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 9.09
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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