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Stealth Attacks and Protection Schemes for State Estimators in Power Systems
Abstract
State estimators in power systems are currently used to, for example, detect faulty equipment and to route power flows. It is believed that state estimators will also play an increasingly important role in future smart power grids, as a tool to optimally and more dynamically route power flows. Therefore security of the estimator becomes an important issue. The estimators are currently located in control centers, and large numbers of measurements are sent over unencrypted communication channels to the centers. We here study stealthy false-data attacks against these estimators. We define a security measure tailored to quantify how hard attacks are to perform, and describe an efficient algorithm to compute it. Since there are so many measurement devices in these systems, it is not reasonable to assume that all devices can be made encrypted overnight in the future. Therefore we propose two algorithms to place encrypted devices in the system such as to maximize their utility in terms of increased system security. We illustrate the effectiveness of our algorithms on two IEEE benchmark power networks under two attack and protection cost models.
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Cited by
Smart Grid — The New and Improved Power Grid: A Survey
Fang, X., Misra, S., Xue, G., & Yang, D. (2012) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/surv.2011.101911.00087 · Cited by 3,405
Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems
Pasqualetti, F., Dorfler, F., & Bullo, F. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2013.2266831 · Cited by 2,109
Input-to-State Stabilizing Control Under Denial-of-Service
De Persis, C., & Tesi, P. (2015) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2015.2416924 · Cited by 1,572
False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids
Liu, Y., Ning, P., & Reiter, M. K. (2009) · Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1653662.1653666 · Cited by 1,285
Malicious Data Attacks on the Smart Grid
Kosut, O., Jia, L., Thomas, R. J., & Tong, L. (2011) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2011.2163807 · Cited by 784
Metadata
- Authors
- Dan, G., & Sandberg, H.
- Venue
- 2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2010-10
- Pages
- 214-219
- OpenAlex
- W1992488456
- Cited by
- 415
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 42.71
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Dan, G., & Sandberg, H. (2010). Stealth Attacks and Protection Schemes for State Estimators in Power Systems. 2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications. https://doi.org/10.1109/smartgrid.2010.5622046
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