The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
BIND: A Fine-Grained Attestation Service for Secure Distributed Systems
Abstract
In this paper we propose BIND (binding instructions and data), a fine-grained attestation service for securing distributed systems. Code attestation has recently received considerable attention in trusted computing. However, current code attestation technology is relatively immature. First, due to the great variability in software versions and configurations, verification of the hash is difficult. Second, the time-of-use and time-of-attestation discrepancy remains to be addressed, since the code may be correct at the time of the attestation, but it may be compromised by the time of use. The goal of BIND is to address these issues and make code attestation more usable in securing distributed systems. BIND offers the following properties: (1) BIND performs fine-grained attestation. Instead of attesting to the entire memory content, BIND attests only to the piece of code we are concerned about. This greatly simplifies verification. (2) BIND narrows the gap between time-of-attestation and time-of-use. BIND measures a piece of code immediately before it is executed and uses a sandboxing mechanism to protect the execution of the attested code. (3) BIND ties the code attestation with the data that the code produces, such that we can pinpoint what code has been run to generate that data. In addition, by incorporating the verification of input data integrity into the attestation, BIND offers transitive integrity verification, i.e., through one signature, we can vouch for the entire chain of processes that have performed transformations over a piece of data. BIND offers a general solution toward establishing a trusted environment for distributed system designers.
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Cites
The Byzantine generals problem
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Castro, M., & Liskov, B. (2002) · ACM Transactions on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/571637.571640 · Cited by 2,475
A secure and reliable bootstrap architecture
Arbaugh, W. A., Farber, D. J., & Smith, J. M. (2002) · Proceedings. 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Cat. No.97CB36097) · doi:10.1109/secpri.1997.601317 · Cited by 562
Understanding BGP misconfiguration
Mahajan, R., Wetherall, D., & Anderson, T. (2002) · Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications · doi:10.1145/633025.633027 · Cited by 533
Cited by
A Survey on Cyber Security for Smart Grid Communications
Yan, Y., Qian, Y., Sharif, H., & Tipper, D. (2012) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/surv.2012.010912.00035 · Cited by 716
Flicker: an execution infrastructure for tcb minimization
McCune, J. M., Parno, B. J., Perrig, A., Reiter, M. K., & Isozaki, H. (2008) · Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2008 · doi:10.1145/1352592.1352625 · Cited by 640
Self-citationHyperSafe: A Lightweight Approach to Provide Lifetime Hypervisor Control-Flow Integrity
Wang, Z., & Jiang, X. (2010) · 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2010.30 · Cited by 403
Pioneer: verifying code integrity and enforcing untampered code execution on legacy systems
Seshadri, A., Luk, M., Shi, E., Perrig, A., van Doorn, L., & Khosla, P. (2005) · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · doi:10.1145/1095809.1095812 · Cited by 314
Self-citationPRIMA: policy-reduced integrity measurement architecture
Jaeger, T., Sailer, R., & Shankar, U. (2006) · Proceedings of the eleventh ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies - SACMAT '06 · doi:10.1145/1133058.1133063 · Cited by 296
Metadata
- Authors
- Shi, E., Perrig, A., & Van Doorn, L.
- Venue
- 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2005-05-24
- Pages
- 154-168
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2115175416
- Cited by
- 251
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 16.69
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Shi, E., Perrig, A., & Van Doorn, L. (2005). BIND: A Fine-Grained Attestation Service for Secure Distributed Systems. 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05). https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2005.4
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