The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Exploring Multiple Execution Paths for Malware Analysis
Abstract
Malicious code (or Malware) is defined as software that fulfills the deliberately harmful intent of an attacker. Malware analysis is the process of determining the behavior and purpose of a given Malware sample (such as a virus, worm, or Trojan horse). This process is a necessary step to be able to develop effective detection techniques and removal tools. Currently, Malware analysis is mostly a manual process that is tedious and time-intensive. To mitigate this problem, a number of analysis tools have been proposed that automatically extract the behavior of an unknown program by executing it in a restricted environment and recording the operating system calls that are invoked. The problem of dynamic analysis tools is that only a single program execution is observed. Unfortunately, however, it is possible that certain malicious actions are only triggered under specific circumstances (e.g., on a particular day, when a certain file is present, or when a certain command is received). In this paper, we propose a system that allows us to explore multiple execution paths and identify malicious actions that are executed only when certain conditions are met. This enables us to automatically extract a more complete view of the program under analysis and identify under which circumstances suspicious actions are carried out. Our experimental results demonstrate that many Malware samples show different behavior depending on input read from the environment. Thus, by exploring multiple execution paths, we can obtain a more complete picture of their actions.
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Cites
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DART: directed automated random testing
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Cited by
A survey on automated dynamic malware-analysis techniques and tools
Egele, M., Scholte, T., Kirda, E., & Kruegel, C. (2012) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/2089125.2089126 · Cited by 871
Self-citationAutomatic analysis of malware behavior using machine learning
Rieck, K., Trinius, P., Willems, C., & Holz, T. (2011) · Journal of Computer Security · doi:10.3233/jcs-2010-0410 · Cited by 729
Schwartz, E. J., Avgerinos, T., & Brumley, D. (2010) · 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2010.26 · Cited by 717
Panorama: capturing system-wide information flow for malware detection and analysis
Yin, H., Song, D., Egele, M., Kruegel, C., & Kirda, E. (2007) · Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1315245.1315261 · Cited by 683
Self-citationA Comprehensive Review on Malware Detection Approaches
Aslan, O., & Samet, R. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2963724 · Cited by 649
Metadata
- Authors
- Moser, A., Kruegel, C., & Kirda, E.
- Venue
- 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2007-05
- Pages
- 231-245
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2117030266
- Cited by
- 488
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 34.96
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Moser, A., Kruegel, C., & Kirda, E. (2007). Exploring Multiple Execution Paths for Malware Analysis. 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07). https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2007.17
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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