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Cited by 215

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Practical Mitigations for Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks on Modern x86 Processors

Coppens, Bart, Verbauwhede, Ingrid, De Bosschere, Koen, De Sutter, Bjorn·2009·2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Abstract

This paper studies and evaluates the extent to which automated compiler techniques can defend against timing-based side-channel attacks on modern x86 processors. We study how modern x86 processors can leak timing information through side-channels that relate to control flow and data flow. To eliminate key-dependent control flow and key-dependent timing behavior related to control flow, we propose the use of if-conversion in a compiler backend, and evaluate a proof-of-concept prototype implementation. Furthermore, we demonstrate two ways in which programs that lack key-dependent control flow and key-dependent cache behavior can still leak timing information on modern x86 implementations such as the Intel Core 2 Duo, and propose defense mechanisms against them.

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Metadata

Authors
Coppens, B., Verbauwhede, I., De Bosschere, K., & De Sutter, B.
Venue
2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2009-05
Pages
45-60
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2128255161
Cited by
215
References
1
FWCI
3.76
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Practical Mitigations for Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks on Modern x86 Processors. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/sp.2009.19
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Coppens, B., Verbauwhede, I., De Bosschere, K., & De Sutter, B. (2009). Practical Mitigations for Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks on Modern x86 Processors. 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2009.19

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