The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile
Abstract
Modern automobiles are no longer mere mechanical devices; they are pervasively monitored and controlled by dozens of digital computers coordinated via internal vehicular networks. While this transformation has driven major advancements in efficiency and safety, it has also introduced a range of new potential risks. In this paper we experimentally evaluate these issues on a modern automobile and demonstrate the fragility of the underlying system structure. We demonstrate that an attacker who is able to infiltrate virtually any Electronic Control Unit (ECU) can leverage this ability to completely circumvent a broad array of safety-critical systems. Over a range of experiments, both in the lab and in road tests, we demonstrate the ability to adversarially control a wide range of automotive functions and completely ignore driver input\dash including disabling the brakes, selectively braking individual wheels on demand, stopping the engine, and so on. We find that it is possible to bypass rudimentary network security protections within the car, such as maliciously bridging between our car's two internal subnets. We also present composite attacks that leverage individual weaknesses, including an attack that embeds malicious code in a car's telematics unit and that will completely erase any evidence of its presence after a crash. Looking forward, we discuss the complex challenges in addressing these vulnerabilities while considering the existing automotive ecosystem.
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Citations
Cites
International Organization for Standardization
(2011) · SpringerReference · doi:10.1007/springerreference_16847 · Cited by 12,534
International Organization for Standardization
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On the Power of Power Analysis in the Real World: A Complete Break of the KeeLoq Code Hopping Scheme
Eisenbarth, T., Kasper, T., Moradi, A., Paar, C., Salmasizadeh, M., & Shalmani, M. T. M. (2008) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85174-5_12 · Cited by 268
Security analysis of a cryptographically-enabled RFID device
Bono, S., Green, M., Stubblefield, A., Juels, A., Rubin, A. D., & Szydlo, M. (2005) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 266
Secure vehicular communication systems: implementation, performance, and research challenges
Kargl, F., Papadimitratos, P., Buttyan, L., Müter, M., Schoch, E., Wiedersheim, B., Thong, T.-V., Calandriello, G., Held, A., Kung, A., et al. (2008) · IEEE Communications Magazine · doi:10.1109/mcom.2008.4689253 · Cited by 253
Security in Automotive Bus Systems
Wolf, M., Weimerskirch, A., & Paar, C. (2004) · Cited by 242
State of the Art: Embedding Security in Vehicles
Wolf, M., Weimerskirch, A., & Wollinger, T. (2007) · EURASIP Journal on Embedded Systems · doi:10.1155/2007/74706 · Cited by 147
Indesteege, S., Keller, N., Biham, E., Dunkelman, O., & Preneel, B. (2008) · Cited by 103
Secure software updates: disappointments and new challenges
Bellissimo, A., Burgess, J., & Fu, K. E. (2006) · Cited by 85
Research works printed but not linked: 16
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- eisenstein, 2002, GM Hy-Wire drive-by-wire hybrid fuel cell vehicle
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Cited by
Items 1,001–1,001 of 1,001
ROS-Immunity: Integrated Approach for the Security of ROS-enabled Robotic Systems
Rivera, S., Iannillo, A. K., & State, R. (2020) · doi:10.36227/techrxiv.13013336 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Koscher, K., Czeskis, A., Roesner, F., Patel, S., Kohno, T., Checkoway, S., McCoy, D., Kantor, B., Anderson, D., Shacham, H., & Savage, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Washington (US)
- University of California San Diego (US)
- ORCID
- Venue
- 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2010
- Pages
- 447-462
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2116520617
- Semantic Scholar
- 92a8fa2abcb2fb70126df4feb3ba0248221fe931
- Cited by
- 1,957
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 93 · 2025: 122 · 2024: 112 · 2023: 136 · 2022: 166 · 2021: 151 · 2020: 190 · 2019: 172 · 2018: 181 · 2017: 147 · 2016: 134 · 2015: 105 · 2014: 75 · 2013: 74 · 2012: 47
- FWCI
- 30.70
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- automotive cybersecurity, electronic control units, in-vehicle networks, vehicular networks, remote vehicle control, vehicle safety systems
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.