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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile

Abstract

Modern automobiles are no longer mere mechanical devices; they are pervasively monitored and controlled by dozens of digital computers coordinated via internal vehicular networks. While this transformation has driven major advancements in efficiency and safety, it has also introduced a range of new potential risks. In this paper we experimentally evaluate these issues on a modern automobile and demonstrate the fragility of the underlying system structure. We demonstrate that an attacker who is able to infiltrate virtually any Electronic Control Unit (ECU) can leverage this ability to completely circumvent a broad array of safety-critical systems. Over a range of experiments, both in the lab and in road tests, we demonstrate the ability to adversarially control a wide range of automotive functions and completely ignore driver input\dash including disabling the brakes, selectively braking individual wheels on demand, stopping the engine, and so on. We find that it is possible to bypass rudimentary network security protections within the car, such as maliciously bridging between our car's two internal subnets. We also present composite attacks that leverage individual weaknesses, including an attack that embeds malicious code in a car's telematics unit and that will completely erase any evidence of its presence after a crash. Looking forward, we discuss the complex challenges in addressing these vulnerabilities while considering the existing automotive ecosystem.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/sp.2010.34

Cites

15 of 15 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Citations

Cites

Show all 15 references

Research works printed but not linked: 16

  1. edwards, 2009, Exclusive Twitter integration coming to OnStar
  2. eisenstein, 2002, GM Hy-Wire drive-by-wire hybrid fuel cell vehicle
  3. emaus, 2005, Hitchhiker's Guide to the Automotive Embedded Software Universe, Proc Keynote Presentation at SEAS'05 Workshop
  4. goodwin, 2009, Ford Unveils Open-Source Sync Developer Platform
  5. 2008, National Transportation Statistics (Table 1–11 Number of U S Aircraft Vehicles Vessels and Other Conveyances)
  6. 10.1186/1687-3963-2007-074706 · doi:10.1186/1687-3963-2007-074706
  7. 2008, Vehicle safety communications – applications first annual report
  8. 2008, Cooperative intersection collision avoidance system limited to stop sign and traffic signal violations midterm phase i report
  9. charette, 2009, This Car Runs on Code
  10. 2005, Vehicle Safety Communications Project Task 3 Final Report
  11. 0, Grand Challenge
  12. mansur, 0, TunerPro – Professional Automobile Tuning Software
  13. mollman, 2009, From Cars to TVs Apps Are Spreading to the Real World
  14. melosi, 2004, The automobile and the environment in American history
  15. systems, 0, PCLink – Link ECU Tuning Software
  16. 2007, Intersection collision avoidance – violation task 5 final report

Cited by

Items 201–300 of 1,001

Metadata

Authors
Koscher, K., Czeskis, A., Roesner, F., Patel, S., Kohno, T., Checkoway, S., McCoy, D., Kantor, B., Anderson, D., Shacham, H., & Savage, S.
Affiliations
  • University of Washington (US)
  • University of California San Diego (US)
Venue
2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2010
Pages
447-462
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2116520617
Cited by
1,957
References
15
Citations by year
2026: 93 · 2025: 122 · 2024: 112 · 2023: 136 · 2022: 166 · 2021: 151 · 2020: 190 · 2019: 172 · 2018: 181 · 2017: 147 · 2016: 134 · 2015: 105 · 2014: 75 · 2013: 74 · 2012: 47
FWCI
30.70
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
automotive cybersecurity, electronic control units, in-vehicle networks, vehicular networks, remote vehicle control, vehicle safety systems

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.