Cited by 111Advanced Malware Detection TechniquesSecurity and Verification in ComputingDigital and Cyber Forensics

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Upgrading Your Android, Elevating My Malware: Privilege Escalation through Mobile OS Updating

Xing, Luyi, Pan, Xiaorui, Wang, Rui, Yuan, Kan, Wang, XiaoFeng·2014·2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Abstract

Android is a fast evolving system, with new updates coming out one after another. These updates often completely overhaul a running system, replacing and adding tens of thousands of files across Android's complex architecture, in the presence of critical user data and applications (apps for short). To avoid accidental damages to such data and existing apps, the upgrade process involves complicated program logic, whose security implications, however, are less known. In this paper, we report the first systematic study on the Android updating mechanism, focusing on its Package Management Service (PMS). Our research brought to light a new type of security-critical vulnerabilities, called Pileup flaws, through which a malicious app can strategically declare a set of privileges and attributes on a low-version operating system (OS) and wait until it is upgraded to escalate its privileges on the new system. Specifically, we found that by exploiting the Pileup vulnerabilities, the app can not only acquire a set of newly added system and signature permissions but also determine their settings (e.g., protection levels), and it can further substitute for new system apps, contaminate their data (e.g., cache, cookies of Android default browser) to steal sensitive user information or change security configurations, and prevent installation of critical system services. We systematically analyzed the source code of PMS using a program verification tool and confirmed the presence of those security flaws on all Android official versions and over 3000 customized versions. Our research also identified hundreds of exploit opportunities the adversary can leverage over thousands of devices across different device manufacturers, carriers and countries. To mitigate this threat without endangering user data and apps during an upgrade, we also developed a new detection service, called SecUP, which deploys a scanner on the user's device to capture the malicious apps designed to exploit Pileup vulnerabilities, based upon the vulnerability-related information automatically collected from newly released Android OS images.

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Crossref · 10.1109/sp.2014.32

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  • Identity confusion attacks such as the one demonstrated in Section 8.2 violate Whalen et al.'s assumption that a successful FIDO2 credential creation represents a cryptographic attestation of human signals, even if using a secure authenticator.

    “While Whalen et al. argued that a successful FIDO2 credential creation represents a cryptographic attestation of human signals [81], identity confusion attacks such as the one demonstrated in Section 8.2 violate that assumption (even if using a secure authenticator).”

Citations

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Metadata

Authors
Xing, L., Pan, X., Wang, R., Yuan, K., & Wang, X.
Affiliations
  • Indiana University Bloomington (US)
  • Microsoft (United States) (US)
Venue
2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2014-05
Pages
393-408
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2023446630
Cited by
111
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 16 · 2014: 6
FWCI
15.35
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Software › Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital and Cyber Forensics
Keywords
Android, privilege escalation, malware, protection level, vulnerability detection, mobile malware detection

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