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Evaluating the Security Posture of Real-World FIDO2 Deployments

Open access
Kuchhal, Dhruv, Saad, Muhammad, Oest, Adam, Li, Frank · 2023 · Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 60 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

FIDO2 is a suite of protocols that combines the usability of local authentication (e.g., biometrics) with the security of public-key cryptography to deliver passwordless authentication. It eliminates shared authentication secrets (i.e., passwords, which could be leaked or phished) and provides strong security guarantees assuming the benign behavior of the client-side protocol components.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

This paper studies how real-world FIDO2 deployments handle compromised clients, using measurements from 29 relying parties, a year-plus study of the FIDO Metadata Service, and telemetry from a large financial-services RP. It finds that many deployments do not adopt recommended mitigations, that most authenticators lack malware-resistance certification, and that practical malware and social-engineering attacks remain feasible.

## Key findings

  • The authors evaluated 29 RPs from the Tranco Top 1K: 85 sites in the Top 1K supported WebAuthn, collapsing to 40 distinct RPs, of which 29 were evaluable.
  • In the MDS snapshot from April 13, 2023, there were 160 authenticators; only 7/160 (4%) were certified L2 (malware resistant), while 120 were L1 and 58 supported no user verification at all.
  • Among the 29 RPs, only 14/29 requested any attestation, 27/29 allowed a virtual authenticator, and only 3/29 required user verification; only 5/29 declared a preference for platform authenticators.
  • From partner-RP telemetry, the authors observed ∼72% Apple-attested, ∼27% Android SafetyNet-attested, and ∼1% unattested WebAuthn responses; they also report evidence of system integrity compromise on ∼0.25% of hardware-backed clients and ∼13% of non-hardware-backed clients.

## Methods

  • The study combines three measurements: (i) manual/semi-automated analysis of FIDO2 configurations on top websites, (ii) a longitudinal MDS study from September 16, 2021 to April 13, 2023, and (iii) real-world authenticator telemetry from a large financial-services RP.
  • For RP measurement, the authors manually created accounts and inspected WebAuthn registration flows on candidate sites, then tested authenticator registration with Chrome’s virtual authenticator under different transports and protocol settings.
  • For telemetry, they analyzed 126,608 payloads on July 20, 2022 and 74,270 on August 23, 2022 from the partner RP, plus a 14,616-session validation sample with full payloads.

## Limitations

  • The paper states that the partner-RP telemetry was limited to mobile browser sessions and thus the real-world authenticator sample is restricted to mobile devices.
  • It also states that server logging only captured the first 4KB of each payload, so some responses were truncated and not parseable.
  • Evident from the text: the RP configuration study is limited to 29 RPs from the Tranco Top 1K and may not generalize to all FIDO2 deployments.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3576915.3623063

Cites

38 of 38 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Image 1
CC-BY · From the PDF
(c) Extension detects the transaction and attempts attacker-initiated action (e.g., transferring funds to the attacker's wallet) in a background tab. This triggers a FIDO2 authentication prompt.
(c) Extension detects the transaction and attempts attacker-initiated action (e.g., transferring funds to the attacker's wallet) in a background tab. This triggers a FIDO2 authentication prompt.CC-BY · From the PDF
(d) User is tricked into authenticating the attacker's transaction, mistaking it as authenticating their own transaction (which did not actually require authentication).
(d) User is tricked into authenticating the attacker's transaction, mistaking it as authenticating their own transaction (which did not actually require authentication).CC-BY · From the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

2 Valid · 13 Not valid · 44 Not checked · 147 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Show all 38 references

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Florian M Farke, Lennart Lorenz, Theodor Schnitzler, Philipp Markert, and Markus Dürmuth. 2020. You still use the password after all - Exploring FIDO2 Security Keys in a Small Company. In Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS).
  2. Anthony Gavazzi, Ryan Williams, Engin Kirda, Long Lu, Andre King, Andy Davis, and Tim Leek. 2023. A Study of Multi-Factor and Risk-Based Authentication Availability. In USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security).
  3. Bank of America: Privacy and Security. 2022. Secured Transfer. https://www.ba nkofamerica.com/security-center/faq/additional-security-features/.
  4. Kentrell Owens, Olabode Anise, Amanda Krauss, and Blase Ur. 2021. User perceptions of the usability and security of smartphones as FIDO2 roaming authenticators. In Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS).
  5. Alon Shakevsky, Eyal Ronen, and Avishai Wool. 2022. Trust Dies in Darkness: Shedding Light on Samsung's TrustZone Keymaster Design. In USENIX Security Symposium.
  6. Roman Unuchek. 2017. Kaspersky Daily: Rooting your Android. https://usa.kasp ersky.com/blog/android-root-faq/11581/.
  7. Tara Whalen, Thibault Meunier, Mrudula Kodali, Alex Davidson, Marwan Fayed, Armando Faz-Hernández, Watson Ladd, Deepak Maram, Nick Sullivan, Benedikt Christoph Wolters, et al. 2022. Let The Right One In: Attestation as a Usable CAPTCHA Alternative. In Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS).

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Kuchhal, D., Saad, M., Oest, A., & Li, F.
Affiliations
  • Georgia Institute of Technology (US)
  • PayPal (United States) (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2023-11-15
Pages
2381-2395
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4388858368
Cited by
22
References
26
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 6
FWCI
5.64
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
National Science Foundation (CNS-2055549)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
FIDO2, passwordless authentication, public-key cryptography, biometric authentication, authentication protocol security

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Evaluating the Security Posture of Real-World FIDO2 Deployments. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3576915.3623063
The paper
Kuchhal, D., Saad, M., Oest, A., & Li, F. (2023). Evaluating the Security Posture of Real-World FIDO2 Deployments. Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623063

Data sources

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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