SoK: Secure Messaging
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Motivated by recent revelations of widespread state surveillance of personal communication, many solutions now claim to offer secure and private messaging. This includes both a large number of new projects and many widely adopted tools that have added security features. The intense pressure in the past two years to deliver solutions quickly has resulted in varying threat models, incomplete objectives, dubious security claims, and a lack of broad perspective on the existing cryptographic literature on secure communication. In this paper, we evaluate and systematize current secure messaging solutions and propose an evaluation framework for their security, usability, and ease-of-adoption properties. We consider solutions from academia, but also identify innovative and promising approaches used "in-the-wild" that are not considered by the academic literature. We identify three key challenges and map the design landscape for each: trust establishment, conversation security, and transport privacy. Trust establishment approaches offering strong security and privacy features perform poorly from a usability and adoption perspective, whereas some hybrid approaches that have not been well studied in the academic literature might provide better trade-offs in practice. In contrast, once trust is established, conversation security can be achieved without any user involvement in most two-party conversations, though conversations between larger groups still lack a good solution. Finally, transport privacy appears to be the most difficult problem to solve without paying significant performance penalties.
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Citations
Cites
Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router
Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., & Syverson, P. (2004) · doi:10.21236/ada465464 · Cited by 4,104 · cited 1×
“An onion routing protocol, such as the widely used Tor protocol [115], provides sender anonymity, participant anonymity,”
MethodThe Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes
Bonneau, J., Herley, C., Oorschot, P. C. V., & Stajano, F. (2012) · 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2012.44 · Cited by 1,110 · cited 1×
“ZRTP, and several earlier products, use the SAS method by requiring participants to read strings aloud and thus anchors trust in the ability of participants to recognize each other’s voices [23], [24].”
MethodSelf-citationThe Emperor's New Security Indicators
Schechter, S. E., Dhamija, R., Ozment, A., & Fischer, I. (2007) · 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) · doi:10.1109/sp.2007.35 · Cited by 405
SoK: SSL and HTTPS: Revisiting Past Challenges and Evaluating Certificate Trust Model Enhancements
Clark, J., & van Oorschot, P. C. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.41 · Cited by 224 · cited 2×
“Additionally, since key agreements can only be performed with connected devices, there is no trivial multi-device support .”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Unger, N., Dechand, S., Bonneau, J., Fahl, S., Perl, H., Goldberg, I., & Smith, M.
- Venue
- 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2015-05
- Pages
- 232-249
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1544435806
- Cited by
- 158
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 11.36
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: SoK: Secure Messaging. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/sp.2015.22
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- Unger, N., Dechand, S., Bonneau, J., Fahl, S., Perl, H., Goldberg, I., & Smith, M. (2015). SoK: Secure Messaging. 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2015.22
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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