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Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical

Open access
Liu, Fangfei, Yarom, Yuval, Ge, Qian, Heiser, Gernot, Lee, Ruby B.·2015·2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Abstract

We present an effective implementation of the Prime+Probe side-channel attack against the last-level cache. We measure the capacity of the covert channel the attack creates and demonstrate a cross-core, cross-VM attack on multiple versions of GnuPG. Our technique achieves a high attack resolution without relying on weaknesses in the OS or virtual machine monitor or on sharing memory between attacker and victim.

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Metadata

Authors
Liu, F., Yarom, Y., Ge, Q., Heiser, G., & Lee, R. B.
Venue
2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2015-05
Pages
605-622
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1934458198
Cited by
1,009
References
5
FWCI
49.24
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/sp.2015.43
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Liu, F., Yarom, Y., Ge, Q., Heiser, G., & Lee, R. B. (2015). Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical. 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2015.43

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.