The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks
Abstract
In modern computer systems, user processes are isolated from each other by the operating system and the hardware. Additionally, in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hypervisor isolates tenants from other tenants that are co-located on the same physical machine. However, the hypervisor does not protect tenants against the cloud provider and thus the supplied operating system and hardware. Intel SGX provides a mechanism that addresses this scenario. It aims at protecting user-level software from attacks from other processes, the operating system, and even physical attackers.
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Citations
Cites
de Moura, L., & Bjørner, N. (2008) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-78800-3_24 · Cited by 6,595
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
Kocher, P. C. (1996) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9 · Cited by 4,387
Cache Attacks and Countermeasures: The Case of AES
Osvik, D. A., Shamir, A., & Tromer, E. (2006) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11605805_1 · Cited by 1,352
(2016) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Cited by 1,288
An updated performance comparison of virtual machines and Linux containers
Felter, W., Ferreira, A., Rajamony, R., & Rubio, J. (2015) · 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Performance Analysis of Systems and Software (ISPASS) · doi:10.1109/ispass.2015.7095802 · Cited by 1,054
Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical
Liu, F., Yarom, Y., Ge, Q., Heiser, G., & Lee, R. B. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.43 · Cited by 1,009
FLUSH+RELOAD: a high resolution, low noise, L3 cache side-channel attack
Yarom, Y., & Falkner, K. E. K. (2013) · Cited by 987
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems
Xu, Y., Cui, W., & Peinado, M. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.45 · Cited by 713
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX
Schuster, F., Costa, M., Fournet, C., Gkantsidis, C., Peinado, M., Mainar-Ruiz, G., & Russinovich, M. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.10 · Cited by 595
SCONE: secure Linux containers with Intel SGX
(2016) · Operating Systems Design and Implementation · doi:10.5555/3026877.3026930 · Cited by 582
Cited by
Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Kocher, P., Genkin, D., Gruss, D., Haas, W., Hamburg, M., Lipp, M., Mangard, S., Prescher, T., Schwarz, M., & Yarom, Y. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.01203 · Cited by 1,850
Self-citationZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling
Schwarz, M., Lipp, M., Moghimi, D., Van Bulck, J., Stecklina, J., Prescher, T., & Gruss, D. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3319535.3354252 · Cited by 328
Self-citationSgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution
Chen, G., Chen, S., Xiao, Y., Zhang, Y., Lin, Z., & Lai, T. H. (2019) · 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2019.00020 · Cited by 319
A survey on the (in)security of trusted execution environments
Muñoz, A., Ríos, R., Román, R., & López, J. (2023) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2023.103180 · Cited by 131
Security Vulnerabilities of SGX and Countermeasures: A Survey
Fei, S., Yan, Z., Ding, W., & Xie, H. (2022) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3456631 · Cited by 122
Metadata
- Authors
- Schwarz, M., Weiser, S., Gruss, D., Maurice, C., & Mangard, S.
- Venue
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- Published
- 2017
- Pages
- 3-24
- ISSN
- 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
- 1611-3349
- OpenAlex
- W2594560662
- Cited by
- 339
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 22.99
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Schwarz, M., Weiser, S., Gruss, D., Maurice, C., & Mangard, S. (2017). Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60876-1_1
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