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Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems
Open accessAbstract
The presence of large numbers of security vulnerabilities in popular feature-rich commodity operating systems has inspired a long line of work on excluding these operating systems from the trusted computing base of applications, while retaining many of their benefits. Legacy applications continue to run on the untrusted operating system, while a small hyper visor or trusted hardware prevents the operating system from accessing the applications' memory. In this paper, we introduce controlled-channel attacks, a new type of side-channel attack that allows an untrusted operating system to extract large amounts of sensitive information from protected applications on systems like Overshadow, Ink Tag or Haven. We implement the attacks on Haven and Ink Tag and demonstrate their power by extracting complete text documents and outlines of JPEG images from widely deployed application libraries. Given these attacks, it is unclear if Over shadow's vision of protecting unmodified legacy applications from legacy operating systems running on off-the-shelf hardware is still tenable.
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Cites
Using ARM trustzone to build a trusted language runtime for mobile applications
Santos, N., Raj, H., Saroiu, S., & Wolman, A. (2014) · Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/2541940.2541949 · Cited by 192
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Town Crier: An Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts
Zhang, F., Cecchetti, E., Croman, K., Juels, A., & Shi, E. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978326 · Cited by 580
Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX
Wang, W., Chen, G., Pan, X., Zhang, Y., Wang, X., Bindschaedler, V., Tang, H., & Gunter, C. A. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3133956.3134038 · Cited by 320
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution
Chen, G., Chen, S., Xiao, Y., Zhang, Y., Lin, Z., & Lai, T. H. (2019) · 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2019.00020 · Cited by 319
Metadata
- Authors
- Xu, Y., Cui, W., & Peinado, M.
- Venue
- 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2015-05
- Pages
- 640-656
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2150620897
- Cited by
- 713
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 44.70
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Xu, Y., Cui, W., & Peinado, M. (2015). Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems. 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2015.45
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