The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A2: Analog Malicious Hardware
Abstract
While the move to smaller transistors has been a boon for performance it has dramatically increased the cost to fabricate chips using those smaller transistors. This forces the vast majority of chip design companies to trust a third party -- often overseas -- to fabricate their design. To guard against shipping chips with errors (intentional or otherwise) chip design companies rely on post-fabrication testing. Unfortunately, this type of testing leaves the door open to malicious modifications since attackers can craft attack triggers requiring a sequence of unlikely events, which will never be encountered by even the most diligent tester. In this paper, we show how a fabrication-time attacker can leverage analog circuits to create a hardware attack that is small (i.e., requires as little as one gate) and stealthy (i.e., requires an unlikely trigger sequence before effecting a chip's functionality). In the open spaces of an already placed and routed design, we construct a circuit that uses capacitors to siphon charge from nearby wires as they transition between digital values. When the capacitors fully charge, they deploy an attack that forces a victim flip-flop to a desired value. We weaponize this attack into a remotely-controllable privilege escalation by attaching the capacitor to a wire controllable and by selecting a victim flip-flop that holds the privilege bit for our processor. We implement this attack in an OR1200 processor and fabricate a chip. Experimental results show that our attacks work, show that our attacks elude activation by a diverse set of benchmarks, and suggest that our attacks evade known defenses.
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Cites
MiBench: A free, commercially representative embedded benchmark suite
Guthaus, M. R., Ringenberg, J. S., Ernst, D. J., Austin, T. M., Mudge, T., & Brown, R. B. (2001) · doi:10.1109/wwc.2001.15 · Cited by 3,103
Self-citationMiBench: A free, commercially representative embedded benchmark suite
Guthaus, M. R., Ringenberg, J. S., Ernst, D., Austin, T. M., Mudge, T., & Brown, R. B. (2005) · Proceedings of the Fourth Annual IEEE International Workshop on Workload Characterization. WWC-4 (Cat. No.01EX538) · doi:10.1109/wwc.2001.990739 · Cited by 1,588
Self-citationRazor: a low-power pipeline based on circuit-level timing speculation
Ernst, D., Kim, N. S., Das, S., Pant, S., Rao, R. R., Pham, T. T., Ziesler, C. H., Blaauw, D. T., Austin, T. M., Flautner, K., et al. (2003) · doi:10.5555/956417.956571 · Cited by 1,072
Self-citationRazor: a low-power pipeline based on circuit-level timing speculation
Ernst, D., Kim, N. S., Das, S., Pant, S., Rao, R., Pham, T., Ziesler, C., Blaauw, D., Austin, T., Flautner, K., et al. (2004) · 22nd Digital Avionics Systems Conference. Proceedings (Cat. No.03CH37449) · doi:10.1109/micro.2003.1253179 · Cited by 858
Self-citationTrojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting
Agrawal, D., Baktir, S., Karakoyunlu, D., Rohatgi, P., & Sunar, B. (2007) · 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) · doi:10.1109/sp.2007.36 · Cited by 793
Hardware Trojan detection using path delay fingerprint
Jin, Y., & Makris, Y. (2008) · 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust · doi:10.1109/hst.2008.4559049 · Cited by 643
Overcoming an Untrusted Computing Base: Detecting and Removing Malicious Hardware Automatically
Hicks, M., Finnicum, M., King, S. T., Martin, M. M. K., & Smith, J. M. (2010) · 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2010.18 · Cited by 335
Self-citationDesigning and implementing malicious hardware
King, S. T., Tucek, J. A., Cozzie, A., Grier, C., Jiang, W., & Zhou, Y. (2008) · Cited by 284
At-speed delay characterization for IC authentication and Trojan Horse detection
Li, J., & Lach, J. (2008) · 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust · doi:10.1109/hst.2008.4559038 · Cited by 272
Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans
Becker, G. T., Regazzoni, F., Paar, C., & Burleson, W. P. (2013) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40349-1_12 · Cited by 264
Metadata
- Authors
- Yang, K., Hicks, M., Dong, Q., Austin, T., & Sylvester, D.
- Venue
- 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2016-05
- Pages
- 18-37
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2511192821
- Cited by
- 255
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 23.67
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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