The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Secure Two-party Threshold ECDSA from ECDSA Assumptions
Abstract
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is one of the most widely used schemes in deployed cryptography. Through its applications in code and binary authentication, web security, and cryptocurrency, it is likely one of the few cryptographic algorithms encountered on a daily basis by the average person. However, its design is such that executing multi-party or threshold signatures in a secure manner is challenging: unlike other, less widespread signature schemes, secure multi-party ECDSA requires custom protocols, which has heretofore implied reliance upon additional cryptographic assumptions such as the Paillier encryption scheme. We propose new protocols for multi-party ECDSA key-generation and signing with a threshold of two, which we prove secure against malicious adversaries in the random oracle model using only the Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption and the assumptions already implied by ECDSA itself. Our scheme requires only two messages, and via implementation we find that it outperforms the best prior results in practice by a factor of 55 for key generation and 16 for signing, coming to within a factor of 12 of local signatures. Concretely, two parties can jointly sign a message in just over two milliseconds.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Shamir, A. (1979) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/359168.359176 · Cited by 13,756 · cited 3×
“Specifically, we use Shamir Secret Sharing [17], and a simple consistency check allows us to guarantee security against malicious adversaries.”
MethodA method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. (1978) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/359340.359342 · Cited by 13,462
A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Elgamal, T. (1985) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1985.1057074 · Cited by 8,059 · cited 1×
“These are based upon a combination of the well-known ElGamal [16] and Shamir Secret-Sharing [17] primitives, and carry the disadvantage that they require a trusted party to distribute private keys.”
MethodPublic-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes
Paillier, P. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48910-x_16 · Cited by 7,250
Cited by
Anonymous Multi-Hop Locks for Blockchain Scalability and Interoperability
Malavolta, G., Moreno-Sanchez, P., Schneidewind, C., Kate, A., & Maffei, M. (2019) · Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2019.23330 · Cited by 270
Boosting Privately: Privacy-Preserving Federated Extreme Boosting for Mobile Crowdsensing
Liu, Y., Ma, Z., Liu, X., Ma, S., Nepal, S., & Deng, R. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1907.10218 · Cited by 52
Cloud-based federated boosting for mobile crowdsensing
Wang, Z., Yang, Y., Liu, Y., Liu, X., Gupta, B. B., & Ma, J. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2005.05304 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Doerner, J., Kondi, Y., Lee, E., & Shelat, A.
- Venue
- 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2018-05
- Pages
- 980-997
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2882981146
- Cited by
- 164
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 6.03
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.