Cited by 13,756Cryptography and Data SecurityCoding theory and cryptographyCloud Data Security Solutions

How to share a secret

Open access
Shamir, Adi·1979·Communications of the ACM

Abstract

In this paper we show how to divide data D into n pieces in such a way that D is easily reconstructable from any k pieces, but even complete knowledge of k - 1 pieces reveals absolutely no information about D . This technique enables the construction of robust key management schemes for cryptographic systems that can function securely and reliably even when misfortunes destroy half the pieces and security breaches expose all but one of the remaining pieces.

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Crossref · 10.1145/359168.359176

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7 of 7 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The scheme proposed by Shamir relies on standard Lagrange polynomial interpolation, while Blakley's proposal, also known as vector scheme, relies on the geometric concept of intersecting hyperplanes.

    “The scheme proposed by Shamir relies on standard Lagrange polynomial interpolation, while Blakley's proposal, also known as vector scheme, relies on the geometric concept of intersecting hyperplanes.”

    From A Survey of Self-Sovereign Identity Ecosystem (2021) · cites this paper as [123]

    In “A Simple (k, n) Threshold Scheme” (p. 612), Shamir says his scheme is based on polynomial interpolation and reconstructs the secret by interpolating from k shares. The paper mentions Blakley’s different scheme on p. 612 but does not describe it as a vector scheme or explain it through intersecting hyperplanes. It also does not name Lagrange interpolation specifically. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • In 1979, Shamir and Blakely proposed two variations of threshold-based secret sharing schemes.

    “In 1979, Shamir [123] and Blakely [124] proposed two variations of threshold-based secret sharing schemes.”

    From A Survey of Self-Sovereign Identity Ecosystem (2021) · cites this paper as [123]

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Authors
Shamir, A.
Affiliations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge
Venue
Communications of the ACM
Published
1979-11
Volume
22
Issue
11
Pages
612-613
ISSN
  • 0001-0782 (ISSN-L)
  • 1557-7317
OpenAlex
W2141420453
Cited by
13,756
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 467 · 2025: 758 · 2024: 675 · 2023: 713 · 2022: 643 · 2021: 719 · 2020: 697 · 2019: 670 · 2018: 602 · 2017: 545 · 2016: 563 · 2015: 606 · 2014: 586 · 2013: 617 · 2012: 562
FWCI
7.12
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Communications of the ACM (publishedVersion)
  • DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Coding theory and cryptography
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cloud Data Security Solutions
Keywords
secret sharing, information-theoretic security, key management, cryptographic key distribution, data redundancy, fault tolerance, security breaches

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