The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
FPGA-Based Remote Power Side-Channel Attacks
Abstract
The rapid adoption of heterogeneous computing has driven the integration of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) into cloud datacenters and flexible System-on-Chips (SoCs). This paper shows that the integrated FPGA introduces a new security vulnerability by enabling software-based power side-channel attacks without physical proximity to a target system. We first demonstrate that an on-chip power monitor can be built on a modern FPGA using ring oscillators (ROs), and characterize its ability to observe the power consumption of other modules on the FPGA or the SoC. Then, we show that the RO-based FPGA power monitor can be used for a successful power analysis attack on an RSA cryptomodule on the same FPGA. Additionally, we show that the FPGA-based power monitor can observe the power consumption of a CPU on the same SoC, and demonstrate that the FPGA-to-CPU power side-channel attack can break timing-channel protection for a RSA program running on a CPU. This work introduces and demonstrates remote power side-channel attacks using an FPGA, showing that the common assumption that power side-channel attacks require specialized equipment and physical access to the victim hardware is not true for systems with an integrated FPGA.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Zhao, M., & Suh, G. E.
- Venue
- 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2018-05
- Pages
- 229-244
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2794898833
- Cited by
- 308
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 13.00
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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