SoK: Computer-Aided Cryptography
Open accessAbstract
Computer-aided cryptography is an active area of research that develops and applies formal, machine-checkable approaches to the design, analysis, and implementation of cryptography. We present a cross-cutting systematization of the computer-aided cryptography literature, focusing on three main areas: (i) design-level security (both symbolic security and computational security), (ii) functional correctness and efficiency, and (iii) implementation-level security (with a focus on digital side-channel resistance). In each area, we first clarify the role of computer-aided cryptography—how it can help and what the caveats are—in addressing current challenges. We next present a taxonomy of state-of-the-art tools, comparing their accuracy, scope, trustworthiness, and usability. Then, we highlight their main achievements, trade-offs, and research challenges. After covering the three main areas, we present two case studies. First, we study efforts in combining tools focused on different areas to consolidate the guarantees they can provide. Second, we distill the lessons learned from the computer-aided cryptography community’s involvement in the TLS 1.3 standardization effort. Finally, we conclude with recommendations to paper authors, tool developers, and standardization bodies moving forward.
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Cryptography is a prime target for formal verification.
“simplified versions of 13 functions often used in cryptography which is a prime target for formal verification (Barbosa et al., 2021).”
From A benchmark for vericoding: formally verified program synthesis (2025) · cites this paper as Barbosa et al., 2021
Cites
Dafny: An Automatic Program Verifier for Functional Correctness
Leino, K. R. M. (2010) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17511-4_20 · Cited by 940 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Cryptol + SAW [97] C, Java C, Java SAT, SMT CryptoLine [98] CryptoLine C Boolector, MathSAT, Singular Dafny [99] Dafny C#, Java, JavaScript, Go Boogie, Z3 F∗ [60] F∗ OCaml, F#, C, Asm, Wasm Z3, typechecker Fiat Crypto [6] Gallina C Coq, C compiler Frama-C [100] C C Coq, Alt-Ergo, Why3 gfverif [101] C C g++, Sage Jasmi…”
BackgroundSoK: SSL and HTTPS: Revisiting Past Challenges and Evaluating Certificate Trust Model Enhancements
Clark, J., & van Oorschot, P. C. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.41 · Cited by 224 · see citing works
Using Crash Hoare logic for certifying the FSCQ file system
Chen, H., Ziegler, D., Chajed, T., Chlipala, A., Kaashoek, M. F., & Zeldovich, N. (2015) · Proceedings of the 25th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles · doi:10.1145/2815400.2815402 · Cited by 211 · see citing works
Secure authentication in the grid: A formal analysis of DNP3 SAv5
Cremers, C., Dehnel-Wild, M., & Milner, K. (2019) · Journal of Computer Security · doi:10.3233/jcs-181139 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
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A benchmark for vericoding: formally verified program synthesis
Bursuc, S., Ehrenborg, T., Lin, S., Astefanoaei, L., Chiosa, I. E., Kukovec, J., Singh, A., Butterley, O., Bizid, A., Dougherty, Q., et al. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2509.22908 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“This is a collection of arithmetic algorithms on big numbers in Dafny that we wrote from scratch: simplified versions of 13 functions often used in cryptography which is a prime target for formal verification (Barbosa et al., 2021).”
- Authors
- Barbosa, M., Barthe, G., Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., Cremers, C., Liao, K., & Parno, B.
- Affiliations
- Universidade do Porto (PT)
- Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (DE)
- INRIA,Paris
- Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique (FR)
- Helmholtz Center for Information Security (DE)
- Carnegie Mellon University (US)
- Venue
- 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2021-05
- Volume
- 2019
- Pages
- 777-795
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3003637591
- Cited by
- 143
- References
- 4
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 5
- FWCI
- 11.09
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- inria.hal.science
- Locations
- IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) (publishedVersion)
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive (submittedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- CISPA Helmholtz Center
- Funders
- Foundation for Science and Technology
- Office of Naval Research
- European Research Council
- National Science Foundation
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- formal verification, computational security, functional correctness, side-channel attack resistance, cryptographic protocol design
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