Cited by 208Software Engineering ResearchInformation and Cyber SecurityWeb Application Security Vulnerabilities

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 93 of the 94 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

SoK: Taxonomy of Attacks on Open-Source Software Supply Chains

Open access
Ladisa, Piergiorgio, Plate, Henrik, Martinez, Matias, Barais, Olivier·2023·2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

Abstract

The widespread dependency on open-source software makes it a fruitful target for malicious actors, as demonstrated by recurring attacks. The complexity of today’s open-source supply chains results in a significant attack surface, giving attackers numerous opportunities to reach the goal of injecting malicious code into open-source artifacts that is then downloaded and executed by victims.This work proposes a general taxonomy for attacks on open-source supply chains, independent of specific programming languages or ecosystems, and covering all supply chain stages from code contributions to package distribution. Taking the form of an attack tree, it covers 107 unique vectors, linked to 94 real-world incidents, and mapped to 33 mitigating safeguards.User surveys conducted with 17 domain experts and 134 software developers positively validated the correctness, comprehensiveness and comprehensibility of the taxonomy, as well as its suitability for various use-cases. Survey participants also assessed the utility and costs of the identified safeguards, and whether they are used.

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Show all 94 references

Research works printed but not linked: 19

  1. Clancy, 2021, Deliver uncompromised: Securing critical software supply chains, MITRE Technical Papers, 24
  2. Wu, On the feasibility of stealthily introducing vulnerabilities in open-source software via hypocrite commits
  3. Haddad, 2011, Understanding the open source development model, Linux Journal
  4. Cox, 2019, Our software dependency problem
  5. Schneier, 1999, Attack trees, Dr. Dobb’s journal, 24, 21
  6. Spencer, 2009, Card sorting: Designing usable categories
  7. Du, Towards an analysis of software supply chain risk management, 1
  8. Tschacher, 2016, Typosquatting in programming language package managers
  9. An emergency re-review of kernel commits authored by members of the university of minnesota, due to the hypocrite commits research paper
  10. Kuppusamy, Mercury: Bandwidth-effective prevention of rollback attacks against community repositories, 673
  11. McClure, 2010, Protecting your critical assets-lessons learned from operation aurora, Tech. Rep.
  12. Goerigk, On trojan horses in compiler implementations
  13. Kuppusamy, Diplomat: Using delegations to protect community repositories, 567
  14. Alhamed, Security by decentralized certification of automatic-updates for open source software controlled by volunteers
  15. Almubayed, 2019, Practical approach to automate the discovery and eradication of opensource software vulnerabilities at scale, Blackhat USA
  16. 10.1007/978-3-030-65745-1_7 · DOI
  17. Lamowski, Sand-crust: Automatic sandboxing of unsafe components in rust, 51
  18. 10.1002/smr.1893 · DOI
  19. 10.1109/CSAC.2005.17 · DOI

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Metadata

Authors
Ladisa, P., Plate, H., Martinez, M., & Barais, O.
Affiliations
  • Systems, Applications & Products in Data Processing (Switzerland) (CH)
  • Université Polytechnique Hauts-de-France
  • Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique (FR)
Venue
2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2023-05
Pages
1509-1526
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4385208592
Cited by
208
References
94
Citations by year
2026: 65 · 2025: 63 · 2024: 46 · 2023: 32
FWCI
52.94
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Software Engineering Research
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
Keywords
attack taxonomy, supply chain attacks, malicious code injection, attack trees, software supply chain security, security measures, developer survey, attack vectors

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