The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Secure communication for the robot operating system
Abstract
The boom for robotics technologies in recent years has also empowered a new generation of robotics software. The Robot Operating System (ROS) is one of the most popular frameworks for robotics researchers and makers which is moving towards commercial and industrial use. Security-wise however, ROS is vulnerable to attacks. It is rather easy to inject or eavesdrop data in a ROS application. This opens many different ways to attack a ROS application resulting in data loss, monetary damage or even physical injury. In this paper we present a secure communication channel enabling ROS-nodes to communicate with authenticity and confidentiality. We secure ROS on a peer-to-peer basis in the direct interaction between publishers and subscribers. We describe the implementation changes we have made to the ROS core and assess the overhead introduced by the new security functions.
Overview
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“In fact, this cryptographic method helps reducing DoS attacks.”
From Robotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations (2022) · cites this paper as [295]
In the citing paper
“Breiling et al. presented a solution to secure Robot Operating Systems (ROS) communication channels using cryptographic methods [295].”
From Robotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations (2022) · cites this paper as [295]
Citations
Cites
ROS: an open-source Robot Operating System
Quigley, M. (2009) · Proceedings - IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation/Proceedings · Cited by 8,729
The many faces of publish/subscribe
Eugster, P. T., Felber, P. A., Guerraoui, R., & Kermarrec, A.-M. (2003) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/857076.857078 · Cited by 3,145
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Stouffer, K., Pillitteri, V., Lightman, S., Abrams, M., & Hahn, A. (2015) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-82r2 · Cited by 1,377 · cited 3×
“, as published by NIST [5]), security in industrial control remains”
BackgroundInfluentialDatagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2
Rescorla, E., & Modadugu, N. (2012) · doi:10.17487/rfc6347 · Cited by 639
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Karnouskos, S. (2011) · IECON 2011 - 37th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society · doi:10.1109/iecon.2011.6120048 · Cited by 528
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Cheminod, M., Durante, L., & Valenzano, A. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2012.2198666 · Cited by 349 · cited 2×
“It has already been shown that industrial systems are prone to cyber attacks [1], [2].”
BackgroundA survey SCADA of and critical infrastructure incidents
Miller, B., & Rowe, D. (2012) · Proceedings of the 1st Annual conference on Research in information technology · doi:10.1145/2380790.2380805 · Cited by 336 · cited 1×
“It has already been shown that industrial systems are prone to cyber attacks [1], [2].”
BackgroundIntrusion detection in SCADA systems using machine learning techniques
Maglaras, L. A., & Jiang, J. (2014) · 2014 Science and Information Conference · doi:10.1109/sai.2014.6918252 · Cited by 188
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Cited by
Robotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations
Yaacoub, J.-P. A., Noura, H. N., Salman, O., & Chehab, A. (2022) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-021-00545-8 · Cited by 320
“This presentedriskassessment approachwas applied on an assisting robot, which provided assistance for standing up, sitting down and walking, and health-state monitoring.”
Trusted AI in Multiagent Systems: An Overview of Privacy and Security for Distributed Learning
Ma, C., Li, J., Wei, K., Liu, B., Ding, M., Yuan, L., Han, Z., & Vincent Poor, H. (2023) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2023.3306773 · Cited by 96
Analyzing Cyber-Physical Threats on Robotic Platforms
Ahmad Yousef, K., AlMajali, A., Ghalyon, S., Dweik, W., & Mohd, B. (2018) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s18051643 · Cited by 42
Metadata
- Authors
- Breiling, B., Dieber, B., & Schartner, P.
- Affiliations
- Joanneum Research (AT)
- University of Klagenfurt (AT)
- Venue
- 2017 Annual IEEE International Systems Conference (SysCon)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2017-04
- Pages
- 1-6
- ISSN
- 1944-7620 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2620076267
- Cited by
- 97
- References
- 19
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 3
- FWCI
- 4.12
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE International Systems Conference (SysCon) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Robotics and Automated Systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
- Keywords
- Robot Operating System, secure communication, peer-to-peer communication, data integrity, confidentiality, authenticity, eavesdropping, false data injection attacks, security overhead
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.