Solutions for Multiagent Pursuit-Evasion Games on Communication Graphs: Finite-Time Capture and Asymptotic Behaviors
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this paper, the multiagent pursuit-evasion (MPE) games are solved in order to obtain optimal strategic policies for all players. In these games, multiple pursuers attempt to intercept multiple evaders who try to avoid capture. A graph-theoretic approach is employed to study the interactions of the agents with limited sensing capabilities, such that distributed control policies are obtained for every agent. Furthermore, the minimization of performance indices associated with the goals of the agents is guaranteed. Nash equilibrium among the players is obtained by means of optimal policies that use the solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equations of the game. Minmax strategies are also proposed to guarantee a security-level performance when the solutions of the HJI equations for Nash equilibrium do not exist. Scenarios for finite-time capture and for asymptotic rendezvous are analyzed, and emergent behaviors are obtained by means of modifications of the proposed general-case performance indices. The containment control results are shown to be special cases of the solutions of the MPE games.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationKronecker products and matrix calculus in system theory
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“Using control policies u i = − K pi δ i , the global pursuer dynamics is given by Substituting (51) in (53), and using the properties of the Kronecker product [25], we get ˙ x = 0 .”
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“The resulting solution concept is regarded as a minmax strategy [14] and, as it is shown later, the corresponding HJI equations are generally solvable for linear systems and the resulting control policies are distributed.”
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“Stability analysis of multiagent systems in graphs has been studied in [17] and [18].”
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Self-citationNecessary and sufficient conditions for containment control of networked multi-agent systems
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“4) The containment control problem with static and moving leaders [22], [23] is solved as a special case of the MPE games.”
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“Take the vector ν = [2 , 1] T as the constant velocity of the evaders.”
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Graph-based strategies for multi-player pursuit evasion games
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“Most of the results in the literature find solutions to the MPE games without determining their nature as Nash equilibria, minmax, or any other solution concept [7]–[13].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Lopez, V. G., Lewis, F. L., Wan, Y., Sanchez, E. N., & Fan, L.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Published
- 2020-05
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1911-1923
- ISSN
- 0018-9286 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-2523
- 2334-3303
- OpenAlex
- W2954093458
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 5.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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