The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Low-cost solutions for preventing simple side-channel analysis: side-channel atomicity
Abstract
We introduce simple methods to convert a cryptographic algorithm into an algorithm protected against simple side-channel attacks. Contrary to previously known solutions, the proposed techniques are not at the expense of the execution time. Moreover, they are generic and apply to virtually any algorithm. In particular, we present several novel exponentiation algorithms, namely, a protected square-and-multiply algorithm, its right-to-left counterpart, and several protected sliding-window algorithms. We also illustrate our methodology applied to point multiplication on elliptic curves. All these algorithms share the common feature that the complexity is globally unchanged compared to the corresponding unprotected implementations.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. (1978) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/359340.359342 · Cited by 13,462
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. (1983) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/357980.358017 · Cited by 13,012
Handbook of applied cryptography
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-4512 · Cited by 10,357
Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., & Jun, B. (1999) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48405-1_25 · Cited by 7,407
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
Kocher, P. C. (1996) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9 · Cited by 4,387
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Menezes, A. J., van Oorschot, P. C., & Vanstone, S. A. (2018) · CRC Press eBooks · doi:10.1201/9781439821916 · Cited by 2,896
Goldreich, O. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511546891 · Cited by 2,181
Elliptic Curves in Cryptography
Blake, I. F., Seroussi, G., & Smart, N. P. (1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107360211 · Cited by 1,828
On the Importance of Checking Cryptographic Protocols for Faults
Boneh, D., DeMillo, R. A., & Lipton, R. J. (1997) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-69053-0_4 · Cited by 1,496
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Goldreich, O. (2000) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · Cited by 1,019
Cited by
Faster Addition and Doubling on Elliptic Curves
Bernstein, D. J., & Lange, T. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-76900-2_3 · Cited by 442
Predicting Secret Keys Via Branch Prediction
Acıiçmez, O., Koç, Ç. K., & Seifert, J.-P. (2006) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11967668_15 · Cited by 307
On the power of simple branch prediction analysis
Aciiçmez, O., Koç, Ç. K., & Seifert, J.-P. (2007) · Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1229285.1266999 · Cited by 254
Metadata
- Authors
- Chevallier-Mames, B., Ciet, M., & Joye, M.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Published
- 2004-06
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 760-768
- ISSN
- 0018-9340 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2151279347
- Cited by
- 277
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 16.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Low-cost solutions for preventing simple side-channel analysis: side-channel atomicity. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tc.2004.13
- The paper
- Chevallier-Mames, B., Ciet, M., & Joye, M. (2004). Low-cost solutions for preventing simple side-channel analysis: side-channel atomicity. IEEE Transactions on Computers. https://doi.org/10.1109/tc.2004.13
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.