Cyber Security of Water SCADA Systems—Part II: Attack Detection Using Enhanced Hydrodynamic Models
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper investigates the problem of detection and isolation of attacks on a water distribution network comprised of cascaded canal pools. The proposed approach employs a bank of delay-differential observer systems. The observers are based on an analytically approximate model of canal hydrodynamics. Each observer is insensitive to one fault/attack mode and sensitive to other modes. The design of the observers is achieved by using a delay-dependent linear matrix inequality method. The performance of our model-based diagnostic scheme is tested on a class of adversarial scenarios based on a generalized fault/attack model. This model represents both classical sensor-actuator faults and communication network-induced deception attacks. Our particular focus is on stealthy deception attacks in which the attacker's goal is to pilfer water through canal offtakes. Our analysis reveals the benefits of accurate hydrodynamic models in detecting physical faults and cyber attacks to automated canal systems. We also comment on the criticality of sensor measurements for the purpose of detection. Finally, we discuss the knowledge and effort required for a successful deception attack.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Detection of Abrupt Changes: Theory and Application
Riedel, K. S. (1994) · Technometrics · doi:10.1080/00401706.1994.10485821 · Cited by 3,518
Cited by
A survey on security control and attack detection for industrial cyber-physical systems
Ding, D., Han, Q.-L., Xiang, Y., Ge, X., & Zhang, X.-M. (2018) · Neurocomputing · doi:10.1016/j.neucom.2017.10.009 · Cited by 944
Secure State Estimation and Control of Cyber-Physical Systems: A Survey
Ding, D., Han, Q.-L., Ge, X., & Wang, J. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems · doi:10.1109/tsmc.2020.3041121 · Cited by 591
A survey of physics-based attack detection in cyber-physical systems
Giraldo, J., Urbina, D., Cardenas, A., Valente, J., Faisal, M., Ruths, J., Tippenhauer, N. O., Sandberg, H., & Candell, R. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3203245 · Cited by 535
“[3, 4], the attacker launches physical attacks to the system (physically stealing water from water distribution systems), while at the same time it launches a cyber-attack (compromised sensors send false data masking the effects of the physical attack).”
BackgroundSecure Cooperative Event-Triggered Control of Linear Multiagent Systems Under DoS Attacks
Feng, Z., & Hu, G. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology · doi:10.1109/tcst.2019.2892032 · Cited by 407
Amin, S., Litrico, X., Sastry, S., & Bayen, A. M. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology · doi:10.1109/tcst.2012.2211873 · Cited by 350
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Amin, S., Litrico, X., Sastry, S. S., & Bayen, A. M.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology
- Published
- 2013-09
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1679-1693
- ISSN
- 1063-6536 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-0865
- OpenAlex
- W2063260786
- Cited by
- 156
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 9.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cyber Security of Water SCADA Systems—Part II: Attack Detection Using Enhanced Hydrodynamic Models. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tcst.2012.2211874
- The paper
- Amin, S., Litrico, X., Sastry, S. S., & Bayen, A. M. (2013). Cyber Security of Water SCADA Systems—Part II: Attack Detection Using Enhanced Hydrodynamic Models. IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology. https://doi.org/10.1109/tcst.2012.2211874
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.