PrivateZone: Providing a Private Execution Environment Using ARM TrustZone
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
ARM TrustZone is widely used to provide a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for mobile devices. However, the use of TrustZone is limited because TrustZone resources are only available for some pre-authorized applications. In other words, only alliances of the TrustZone OS vendors and device manufacturers can use TrustZone to secure their services. To help overcome this problem, we designed the PrivateZone framework to enable individual developers to utilize TrustZone resources. Using PrivateZone, developers can run Security Critical Logics (SCL) in a Private Execution Environment (PrEE). The advantage of PrivateZone is its leveraging of TrustZone resources without undermining the security of existing services in the TEE. To guarantee this, PrivateZone creates a PrEE using a memory region that is isolated from both the Rich Execution Environment (REE) and TEE. In this paper, we describe the design and implementation of PrivateZone. The prototype of PrivateZone was implemented on an Arndale board with a Cortex-A15 dual-core processor. We built PrivateZone by exploring both security and virtualization extensions of the ARM architecture. To illustrate the usage and the efficacy of PrivateZone, we developed an Android application based on PrivateZone framework, and evaluated the performance overhead imposed on the OS in the REE and SCLs in the PrEE.
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Cites
A secure and reliable bootstrap architecture
Arbaugh, W. A., Farber, D. J., & Smith, J. M. (2002) · Proceedings. 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Cat. No.97CB36097) · doi:10.1109/secpri.1997.601317 · Cited by 562 · cited 1×
“Secure boot [18] verifies the integrity of images loaded into the TEE.”
MethodUsing ARM trustzone to build a trusted language runtime for mobile applications
Santos, N., Raj, H., Saroiu, S., & Wolman, A. (2014) · Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/2541940.2541949 · Cited by 192 · cited 2×
“Also, without using virtualization, TLR [9] and ObC [10] enable the protection of the security sensitive logic of applications by TrustZone.”
BackgroundMethod
Cited by
SoK: Understanding the Prevailing Security Vulnerabilities in TrustZone-assisted TEE Systems
Cerdeira, D., Santos, N., Fonseca, P., & Pinto, S. (2020) · 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40000.2020.00061 · Cited by 208
“TFence [75] PrivateZone [76] RustZone [77] 2019 TEEv [78] PrOS [79] SANCTUARY [80] Ginseng [81] K. Ryan [61] Table VIII Examples of representative papers that contribute with relevant defense techniques ( D xx ) for overcoming reported TrustZone-assisted TEE issues.”
BackgroundInfluentialA survey on the (in)security of trusted execution environments
Muñoz, A., Ríos, R., Román, R., & López, J. (2023) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2023.103180 · Cited by 131
“There are alternatives that implement exclusive shared memory such as TTEEv, Sanctuary and PrivateZone.”
BackgroundLi, W., Xia, Y., & Chen, H. (2019) · GetMobile: Mobile Computing and Communications · doi:10.1145/3308755.3308761 · Cited by 33
Position Paper: Challenges Towards Securing Hardware-assisted Execution Environments
Ning, Z., Zhang, F., Shi, W., & Shi, W. (2017) · Proceedings of the Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy · doi:10.1145/3092627.3092633 · Cited by 25
Metadata
- Authors
- Jang, J., Choi, C., Lee, J., Kwak, N., Lee, S., Choi, Y., & Kang, B. B.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Published
- 2018-09-01
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 797-810
- ISSN
- 1545-5971 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-0018
- 2160-9209
- OpenAlex
- W2542538106
- Cited by
- 60
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 3.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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