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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Position Paper: Challenges Towards Securing Hardware-assisted Execution Environments

Ning, Zhenyu, Zhang, Fengwei, Shi, Weisong, Shi, Weidong · 2017 · Proceedings of the Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy

Abstract

A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) provides an isolated environment for sensitive workloads. However, the code running in the TEE may contain vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers and further leveraged to corrupt the TEE. The increasing buggy code inside the TEE concerns the security of the entire TEE. In this position paper, we present the challenges towards securing trusted execution environments and potential mitigation.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3092627.3092633

Cites

53 of 53 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

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Claims the paper makes

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Citations

Cites

Show all 53 references

Research works printed but not linked: 12

  1. Ittai Anati , Shay Gueron , Simon P Johnson , and Vincent R Scarlata . 2013 . Innovative Technology for CPU Based Attestation and Sealing . In Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (HASP'13) . Ittai Anati, Shay Gueron, Simon P Johnson, and Vincent R Scarlata. 2013. Innovative Technology for CPU Based Attestation and Sealing. In Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (HASP'13).
  2. BSDaemon , coideloko, and D0nAnd0n . 2008 . System Management Mode Hack: Using SMM for 'Other Purposes'. Phrack Magazine (2008). Issue 65. BSDaemon, coideloko, and D0nAnd0n. 2008. System Management Mode Hack: Using SMM for 'Other Purposes'. Phrack Magazine (2008). Issue 65.
  3. Loic Duflot , Olivier Levillain , Benjamin Morin , and Olivier Grumelard . 2009 . Getting into the SMRAM: SMM Reloaded , In Proceedings of the 12th CanSecWest Conference (CanSecWest'09) . CanSecWest, Vancouver, Canada (2009). Loic Duflot, Olivier Levillain, Benjamin Morin, and Olivier Grumelard. 2009. Getting into the SMRAM: SMM Reloaded, In Proceedings of the 12th CanSecWest Conference (CanSecWest'09). CanSecWest, Vancouver, Canada (2009).
  4. Intel. 2014. 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual : Chapter 34. ( 2014 ). Intel. 2014. 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual: Chapter 34. (2014).
  5. Intel. 2015 . ISCA 2015 SGX Tutorial. https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/332680-002 .pdf. (2015). Intel. 2015. ISCA 2015 SGX Tutorial. https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/332680-002.pdf. (2015).
  6. Intel Security Group . 2017. INTEL-SA-00075. https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00075&languageid=en-fr. (May 2017 ). Accessed 05/10/2017. Intel Security Group. 2017. INTEL-SA-00075. https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00075&languageid=en-fr. (May 2017). Accessed 05/10/2017.
  7. Corey Kallenberg and Xeno Kovah. 2015. How Many Million BIOSes Would you Like to Infect? http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2015ams/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/D1T1-Xeno-Kovah-and-Corey-Kallenberg-How-Many-Million-BIOSes-Would-You-Like-to-Infect.pdf. (2015). Corey Kallenberg and Xeno Kovah. 2015. How Many Million BIOSes Would you Like to Infect? http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2015ams/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/D1T1-Xeno-Kovah-and-Corey-Kallenberg-How-Many-Million-BIOSes-Would-You-Like-to-Infect.pdf. (2015).
  8. Corey Kallenberg and Rafal Wojtczuk . 2014 . Speed Racer: Exploiting an Intel Flash Protection Race Condition. https://events.ccc.de/congress/2014/Fahrplan/system/attachments/2565/original/speed_racer_whitepaper.pdf. (2014). Corey Kallenberg and Rafal Wojtczuk. 2014. Speed Racer: Exploiting an Intel Flash Protection Race Condition. https://events.ccc.de/congress/2014/Fahrplan/system/attachments/2565/original/speed_racer_whitepaper.pdf. (2014).
  9. David Kaplan , Tom Woller , and Jeremy Powell . 2016 . AMD Memory Encryption Tutorial , ISCA 2016 . https://sites.google.com/site/metisca2016/. (2016). David Kaplan, Tom Woller, and Jeremy Powell. 2016. AMD Memory Encryption Tutorial, ISCA 2016. https://sites.google.com/site/metisca2016/. (2016).
  10. Dan Rosenberg . 2014. Reflections on trusting trustzone. BlackHat USA ( 2014 ). Dan Rosenberg. 2014. Reflections on trusting trustzone. BlackHat USA (2014).
  11. D Shen . 2015. Attacking your trusted core: Exploiting trustzone on android. Black Hat USA ( 2015 ). D Shen. 2015. Attacking your trusted core: Exploiting trustzone on android. Black Hat USA (2015).
  12. Rafal Wojtczuk and Corey Kallenberg . 2014 . Attacking UEFI Boot Script. 31st Chaos Communication Congress (31C3), http://events.ccc.de/congress/2014/Fahrplan/system/attachments/2566/original/venamis_whitepaper.pdf. (2014). Rafal Wojtczuk and Corey Kallenberg. 2014. Attacking UEFI Boot Script. 31st Chaos Communication Congress (31C3), http://events.ccc.de/congress/2014/Fahrplan/system/attachments/2566/original/venamis_whitepaper.pdf. (2014).

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Ning, Z., Zhang, F., Shi, W., & Shi, W.
Affiliations
Wayne State University (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy
Publisher
ACM
Published
2017-06-25
Pages
1-8
OpenAlex
W2678250197
Cited by
25
References
53
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 3
FWCI
1.75
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Funders
  • North Atlantic Treaty Organization (G110696)
  • National Science Foundation (DGE 1433817)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Real-Time Systems Scheduling
Keywords
trusted execution environments, security risk mitigation

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Position Paper: Challenges Towards Securing Hardware-assisted Execution Environments. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3092627.3092633
The paper
Ning, Z., Zhang, F., Shi, W., & Shi, W. (2017). Position Paper: Challenges Towards Securing Hardware-assisted Execution Environments. Proceedings of the Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1145/3092627.3092633

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.