The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Building PUF Based Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol for IoT Without Explicit CRPs in Verifier Database
Abstract
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) promise to be a critical hardware primitive to provide unique identities to billions of connected devices in Internet of Things (IoTs). In traditional authentication protocols a user presents a set of credentials with an accompanying proof such as password or digital certificate. However, IoTs need more evolved methods as these classical techniques suffer from the pressing problems of password dependency and inability to bind access requests to the “things” from which they originate. Additionally, the protocols need to be lightweight and heterogeneous. Although PUFs seem promising to develop such mechanism, it puts forward an open problem of how to develop such mechanism without needing to store the secret challenge-response pair (CRP) explicitly at the verifier end. In this paper, we develop an authentication and key exchange protocol by combining the ideas of Identity based Encryption (IBE), PUFs and Key-ed Hash Function to show that this combination can help to do away with this requirement. The security of the protocol is proved formally under the Session Key Security and the Universal Composability Framework. A prototype of the protocol has been implemented to realize a secured video surveillance camera using a combination of an Intel Edison board, with a Digilent Nexys-4 FPGA board consisting of an Artix-7 FPGA, together serving as the IoT node. We show, though the stand-alone video camera can be subjected to man-in-the-middle attack via IP-spoofing using standard network penetration tools, the camera augmented with the proposed protocol resists such attacks and it suits aptly in an IoT infrastructure making the protocol deployable for the industry.
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“Once the hardware information is leaked, the security of the system is no longer guaranteed.”
From Secure Video Surveillance Framework in Smart City (2021) · cites this paper as [22]
Citations
Cites
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
Boneh, D., & Franklin, M. (2003) · SIAM Journal on Computing · doi:10.1137/s0097539701398521 · Cited by 3,540
Universally composable security: a new paradigm for cryptographic protocols
Canetti, R. (2001) · Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/sfcs.2001.959888 · Cited by 3,348
Introduction to Modern Cryptography
Katz, J., & Lindell, Y. (2007) · doi:10.1201/9781420010756 · Cited by 1,238
Extracting secret keys from integrated circuits
Lim, D., Lee, J. W., Gassend, B., Suh, G. E., van Dijk, M., & Devadas, S. (2005) · IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems · doi:10.1109/tvlsi.2005.859470 · Cited by 1,049
Modeling attacks on physical unclonable functions
Rührmair, U., Sehnke, F., Sölter, J., Dror, G., Devadas, S., & Schmidhuber, J. (2010) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/1866307.1866335 · Cited by 1,035
Controlled physical random functions
Gassend, B., Clarke, D. E., van Dijk, M., & Devadas, S. (2003) · Annual Computer Security Applications Conference · doi:10.1109/csac.2002.1176287 · Cited by 390
Mutual Authentication in IoT Systems Using Physical Unclonable Functions
Aman, M. N., Chua, K. C., & Sikdar, B. (2017) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2017.2703088 · Cited by 316
Cloning Physically Unclonable Functions
Helfmeier, C., Boit, C., Nedospasov, D., & Seifert, J. (2013) · IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST) · doi:10.1109/hst.2013.6581556 · Cited by 288
Slender PUF Protocol: A Lightweight, Robust, and Secure Authentication by Substring Matching
Majzoobi, M., Rostami, M., Koushanfar, F., Wallach, D. S., & Devadas, S. (2012) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw.2012.30 · Cited by 230
Elliptic-Curve-Based Security Processor for RFID
Lee, Y. K., Sakiyama, K., Batina, L., et al. (2008) · IEEE Transactions on Computers · doi:10.1109/tc.2008.148 · Cited by 228
Cited by
Sorted by citations
A survey on physical unclonable function (PUF)-based security solutions for Internet of Things
Shamsoshoara, A., Korenda, A. R., Afghah, F., & Zeadally, S. (2020) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2020.107593 · Cited by 352
Mall, P., Amin, R., Das, A. K., Leung, M. T., & Choo, K. R. (2022) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2022.3142084 · Cited by 225
A Survey on Supply Chain Security: Application Areas, Security Threats, and Solution Architectures
Hassija, V., Chamola, V., Gupta, V., Jain, S., & Guizani, N. (2020) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.3025775 · Cited by 238
A Privacy-Preserving and Scalable Authentication Protocol for the Internet of Vehicles
Aman, M. N., Javaid, U., & Sikdar, B. (2020) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.3010893 · Cited by 178
“Table III presents the computational requirement for the proposed protocol and the protocols in [28] and [29].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialLi, S., Zhang, T., Yu, B., & He, K. (2020) · IEEE Sensors Journal · doi:10.1109/jsen.2020.3028872 · Cited by 125
“In addition, the key escrow problem (SF9) exists in protocols [9], [16]–[19], [37] and the protocols [16], [17], [37], [44] need the clock synchronization (SF10) between devices, which may be hard for the resource-constrained node devices in IoT to implement.”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Chatterjee, U., Govindan, V., Sadhukhan, R., Mukhopadhyay, D., Chakraborty, R. S., Mahata, D., & Prabhu, M. M.
- Affiliations
- Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur (IN)
- Wipro (India) (IN)
- ORCID
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Published
- 2019-05-01
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 424-437
- ISSN
- 1545-5971 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-0018
- 2160-9209
- OpenAlex
- W2801237935
- Semantic Scholar
- fb6cb6f6f1e4a6dd07ff58073a5e27f306216b90
- Cited by
- 290
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 35 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 46 · 2022: 42 · 2021: 50 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 14
- FWCI
- 15.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Wipro Limited, Information security education Awareness Program
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
- Keywords
- physical unclonable functions, IoT device authentication, key exchange, identity-based encryption, challenge-response pairs, device identity, session key security, universal composability, man-in-the-middle attacks, IP spoofing, video surveillance cameras
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