Cited by 17IoT and Edge/Fog ComputingSecurity and Verification in ComputingNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection

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Understanding Security Risks of Embedded Devices Through Fine-Grained Firmware Fingerprinting

Open access
Li, Qiang, Tan, Dawei, Ge, Xin, Wang, Haining, Li, Zhi, Liu, Jiqiang·2022·IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing

Abstract

An increasing number of embedded devices are connecting to the Internet, ranging from cameras, routers to printers, while an adversary can exploit security flaws already known to compromise those devices. Security patches are usually associated with the device firmware, which relies on the device vendors and products. Due to compatibility and release-time issues, many embedded devices are still using outdated firmware with known vulnerabilities or flaws. In this article, we conduct a systematic study on device vulnerabilities by leveraging firmware fingerprints. Specifically, we use a web crawler to gather 9,716 firmware images from official websites of device vendors, and 347,685 security reports scattered across data archives, blogs, and forums. We propose to generate fine-grained fingerprints based on the subtle differences between the filesystems of various firmware images. Furthermore, machine learning algorithms and regex are used to identify device vulnerabilities and corresponding device firmware fingerprints. We perform real-world experiments to validate the performance of the firmware fingerprint, which yields high accuracy of 91% precision and 90% recall. We reveal that 6,898 reports have the firmware and related vulnerability information, and there are more than 10% of firmware vulnerabilities without any patches or solutions for mitigating underlying security risks.

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Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1109/tdsc.2021.3119970

Cites

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Figures

Fig. 1 The fine-grained levels of firmware.
Fig. 1 The fine-grained levels of firmware.CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 2 The overview of system design for generating fine-grained fingerprints of firmware.
Fig. 2 The overview of system design for generating fine-grained fingerprints of firmware.CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 3
CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 4 Firmware fingerprints based on DOM trees of local files.
Fig. 4 Firmware fingerprints based on DOM trees of local files.CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 5 The overview of firmware vulnerability discovery from various data sources.
Fig. 5 The overview of firmware vulnerability discovery from various data sources.CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 6 The architecture distribution of the firmware.
Fig. 6 The architecture distribution of the firmware.CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 7 The OS distribution of the firmware.
Fig. 7 The OS distribution of the firmware.CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 8 The distribution of the directory 'WWW' of firmware filesystems extracted form Table 3.
Fig. 8 The distribution of the directory 'WWW' of firmware filesystems extracted form Table 3.CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 9 The similarity matrix of different filesystems of firmware images.
Fig. 9 The similarity matrix of different filesystems of firmware images.CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 10 The Similarity Threshold Value of the Firmware Netgear V1.0.0.34
Fig. 10 The Similarity Threshold Value of the Firmware Netgear V1.0.0.34CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 11 The precision and recall along with the threshold of the firmware.
Fig. 11 The precision and recall along with the threshold of the firmware.CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 12 The precision and recall along with the number of pairs ð request; response Þ .
Fig. 12 The precision and recall along with the number of pairs ð request; response Þ .CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 13 The performance of the similarity threshold to detect the duplicated webpages.
Fig. 13 The performance of the similarity threshold to detect the duplicated webpages.CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 14 The performance of the classifier .
Fig. 14 The performance of the classifier .CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 15 The distribution of patch status of firmware vulnerability .
Fig. 15 The distribution of patch status of firmware vulnerability .CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 16
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 17
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 18
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 19
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 20
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 21
CC-BY · From the PDF

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Research works printed but not linked: 25

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Metadata

Authors
Li, Q., Tan, D., Ge, X., Wang, H., Li, Z., & Liu, J.
Affiliations
  • Beijing Jiaotong University (CN)
  • Virginia Tech (US)
  • Chinese Academy of Sciences (CN)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Published
2022-11-01
Volume
19
Issue
6
Pages
4099-4112
ISSN
  • 1545-5971 (ISSN-L)
  • 1941-0018
  • 2160-9209
OpenAlex
W3207023396
Cited by
17
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 2
FWCI
0.56
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • VTechWorks (Virginia Tech) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • National Key R&D Program of China (2018YFB0803402, 2020YFB2103802)
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (61972024)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
embedded devices, firmware vulnerabilities, vulnerability detection, security patching, vulnerability reports, Internet of Things security

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