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A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends

Open access
Sun, Panjun, Shen, Shigen, Wan, Yi, Wu, Zongda, Fang, Zhaoxi, Gao, Xiao-Zhi · 2024 · IEEE Internet of Things Journal

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 140 of the 143 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 25 of the 80 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

The Internet of Things (IoT) is used in homes and hospitals and deployed outdoors to control and report environmental changes, prevent fires, and perform many more beneficial functions. However, all these benefits come at the tremendous risk of loss of privacy and security issues. To protect the IoT, much research has been carried out to address these risks and find better ways to eliminate them or at least minimize their impact on user privacy and security requirements. This article expounds various network security risks faced by the IoT, analyzes their impacts, discusses risk assessment methods, shows the causes and hazards of these threats, and proposes an overall framework of privacy security protection. This article summarizes the typical defect types in the implementation of IoT firmware, analyzes the generation mechanism of typical defects from the perspectives of fuzzy testing, program verification and machine learning, and compares and expounds the progress of security research for several common IoT protocols. This article analyzes and summarizes the mainstream access control model in the existing IoT and the access control model after using the blockchain and builds a new integrated AIoT architecture for intelligent information processing. Finally, this article expounds on the current legal development status of the privacy protection of network information in various countries and discusses the future prospects of the IoT.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This survey reviews IoT privacy and security across layered architecture, firmware, communication protocols, blockchain access control, AI integration, and privacy laws, and proposes an overall privacy protection framework. It argues that IoT security research remains immature and fragmented, with challenges spanning supply chains, heterogeneous access control, firmware testing, protocol security, and legal/technical privacy protection.

Key findings

  • The paper organizes IoT privacy security by a four-layer architecture—perception, transmission, processing, and application—and identifies threats including RFID/user-location privacy leakage, DoS/DDoS, routing attacks, traffic analysis, spoofing, data-mining privacy disclosure, and weak application-layer disaster/legal protection.
  • In firmware security, it classifies firmware as monolithic, Linux-based, and RTOS-based, and reviews defect detection via static analysis, symbolic execution, fuzzy testing, program verification, and machine learning; it reports that VulSeeker found 50% and 13.89% more defects than Gemini in top-10 and top-50 similar results, respectively.
  • For IoT protocols, it compares ZigBee, BLE, Wi-Fi, and LoRa, and reports that a BLE study analyzed 18,166 apps and found 11,141 (61.3%) use “Just Works” pairing; it also notes Wi-Fi resource-exhaustion attacks can speed energy depletion by 18.5%, and ZigBee RF attacks were demonstrated with $40 hardware.
  • For access control, it reviews RBAC, ABAC, UCON, and CapBAC, then surveys blockchain-integrated models including Bitcoin- and Ethereum-based approaches, smart contracts, and CP-ABE; it identifies future issues in model design, cross-organizational access, cross-chain access control, time optimization, and storage optimization.

Methods

  • Design: a survey that compares itself with related surveys in Table I and claims broader coverage of privacy security technologies, firmware, protocols, access control/blockchain, AIoT, and laws.
  • Data/sample: no empirical dataset or human sample; the paper synthesizes prior literature, standards, attack examples, and legal frameworks, with tables comparing surveys, firmware types, fuzzing tools, machine-learning defect detection, protocols, access-control models, AIoT schemes, and national privacy laws.
  • Main analysis: qualitative synthesis and tabular comparison across IoT layers, firmware defect detection, protocol security properties, blockchain access control, AIoT architectures, and privacy regulations; it also proposes an integrated privacy security protection architecture and future research directions.

Limitations

  • The paper states that existing IoT privacy security research has two major shortcomings: discussions are not comprehensive because most reports use a single perspective, and in-depth analyses of root causes and technical difficulties are lacking.
  • It states that current related surveys have shortcomings such as insufficient comprehensiveness of IoT security and relatively limited technology coverage; it also says AI-integrated IoT security and privacy research is still in the initial stage, mostly conceptual/policy-focused, with few solutions in simulation and limited to specific application scenarios.
  • Evident from the text: the survey does not report a systematic review protocol with search strings, inclusion/exclusion counts, or quality appraisal; several formulas in the privacy security performance metrics section are not decoded in the provided text, limiting reproducibility of those equations.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/jiot.2024.3372518

Cites

140 of 140 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

11 Valid · 24 Not valid · 53 Not checked · 36 Own results and interpretations

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 80
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 67

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

5 of 12 · the rest aren’t loaded

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Citations

Cites

Show all 140 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. 2020, Firmadyne

Cited by

See all 172

Metadata

Authors
Sun, P., Shen, S., Wan, Y., Wu, Z., Fang, Z., & Gao, X.-Z.
Affiliations
  • Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shaoxing University, Shaoxing, China
  • Huzhou Normal University (CN)
  • Shaoxing University (CN)
  • University of Eastern Finland (FI)
Venue
IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Published
2024-11-01
Volume
11
Issue
21
Pages
34567-34591
ISSN
  • 2327-4662 (ISSN-L)
  • 2372-2541
OpenAlex
W4392397286
Cited by
172
References
143
Citations by year
2026: 66 · 2025: 81 · 2024: 25
FWCI
28.47
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Internet of Things Journal (publishedVersion)
  • UEF eRepo (University of Eastern Finland) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China (LQZS24E050001)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Internet of Things and AI
Keywords
Internet of Things security, IoT privacy, network security threats, risk assessment, fuzzing, program verification, machine learning for security, IoT protocols, access control models, blockchain, data privacy law, privacy preservation

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How to cite

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/jiot.2024.3372518
The paper
Sun, P., Shen, S., Wan, Y., Wu, Z., Fang, Z., & Gao, X.-Z. (2024). A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends. IEEE Internet of Things Journal. https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2024.3372518

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.