A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 140 of the 143 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 25 of the 80 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) is used in homes and hospitals and deployed outdoors to control and report environmental changes, prevent fires, and perform many more beneficial functions. However, all these benefits come at the tremendous risk of loss of privacy and security issues. To protect the IoT, much research has been carried out to address these risks and find better ways to eliminate them or at least minimize their impact on user privacy and security requirements. This article expounds various network security risks faced by the IoT, analyzes their impacts, discusses risk assessment methods, shows the causes and hazards of these threats, and proposes an overall framework of privacy security protection. This article summarizes the typical defect types in the implementation of IoT firmware, analyzes the generation mechanism of typical defects from the perspectives of fuzzy testing, program verification and machine learning, and compares and expounds the progress of security research for several common IoT protocols. This article analyzes and summarizes the mainstream access control model in the existing IoT and the access control model after using the blockchain and builds a new integrated AIoT architecture for intelligent information processing. Finally, this article expounds on the current legal development status of the privacy protection of network information in various countries and discusses the future prospects of the IoT.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This survey reviews IoT privacy and security across layered architecture, firmware, communication protocols, blockchain access control, AI integration, and privacy laws, and proposes an overall privacy protection framework. It argues that IoT security research remains immature and fragmented, with challenges spanning supply chains, heterogeneous access control, firmware testing, protocol security, and legal/technical privacy protection.
Key findings
- The paper organizes IoT privacy security by a four-layer architecture—perception, transmission, processing, and application—and identifies threats including RFID/user-location privacy leakage, DoS/DDoS, routing attacks, traffic analysis, spoofing, data-mining privacy disclosure, and weak application-layer disaster/legal protection.
- In firmware security, it classifies firmware as monolithic, Linux-based, and RTOS-based, and reviews defect detection via static analysis, symbolic execution, fuzzy testing, program verification, and machine learning; it reports that VulSeeker found 50% and 13.89% more defects than Gemini in top-10 and top-50 similar results, respectively.
- For IoT protocols, it compares ZigBee, BLE, Wi-Fi, and LoRa, and reports that a BLE study analyzed 18,166 apps and found 11,141 (61.3%) use “Just Works” pairing; it also notes Wi-Fi resource-exhaustion attacks can speed energy depletion by 18.5%, and ZigBee RF attacks were demonstrated with $40 hardware.
- For access control, it reviews RBAC, ABAC, UCON, and CapBAC, then surveys blockchain-integrated models including Bitcoin- and Ethereum-based approaches, smart contracts, and CP-ABE; it identifies future issues in model design, cross-organizational access, cross-chain access control, time optimization, and storage optimization.
Methods
- Design: a survey that compares itself with related surveys in Table I and claims broader coverage of privacy security technologies, firmware, protocols, access control/blockchain, AIoT, and laws.
- Data/sample: no empirical dataset or human sample; the paper synthesizes prior literature, standards, attack examples, and legal frameworks, with tables comparing surveys, firmware types, fuzzing tools, machine-learning defect detection, protocols, access-control models, AIoT schemes, and national privacy laws.
- Main analysis: qualitative synthesis and tabular comparison across IoT layers, firmware defect detection, protocol security properties, blockchain access control, AIoT architectures, and privacy regulations; it also proposes an integrated privacy security protection architecture and future research directions.
Limitations
- The paper states that existing IoT privacy security research has two major shortcomings: discussions are not comprehensive because most reports use a single perspective, and in-depth analyses of root causes and technical difficulties are lacking.
- It states that current related surveys have shortcomings such as insufficient comprehensiveness of IoT security and relatively limited technology coverage; it also says AI-integrated IoT security and privacy research is still in the initial stage, mostly conceptual/policy-focused, with few solutions in simulation and limited to specific application scenarios.
- Evident from the text: the survey does not report a systematic review protocol with search strings, inclusion/exclusion counts, or quality appraisal; several formulas in the privacy security performance metrics section are not decoded in the provided text, limiting reproducibility of those equations.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
11 Valid · 24 Not valid · 53 Not checked · 36 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“However, while providing more applications for people, the IoT faces many privacy security threats [1].”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [1] source
The introductory section says IoT devices are susceptible to cyberattacks and that threats can affect the privacy of the overall system. Section III also identifies multiple issues affecting security and privacy in IoT applications. Page numbers are not supplied in the provided copy. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Bastian Bloessl only used ZigBee hardware worth 40 dollars to conduct selective RF attacks on the network [71].”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [71] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Discussion (p. 10) describes SmartABAC's scope and explicitly leaves protection against attacks outside it. Searches for Bastian Bloessl, $40 ZigBee hardware, and selective RF attacks found no passage in our copy addressing the claim. (LLM, conf=0.76)
plainSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“When using the standardized security level, when the network key is not obtained by preinstallation, the trust center will send the network key currently used by the ZigBee network to the device in an unencrypted form[65].”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [65] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The paper’s §2.2.1 discusses Wi-Fi key management, not ZigBee. Searches for ZigBee, trust-center distribution, and preinstalled network keys found no passage addressing whether a trust center sends a network key unencrypted; page numbers were unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“OTA technology can be used to repair defects such as insecure services and expired components [28].”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [28] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2.2 (page unavailable) says firmware updates and security patches can fix flaws in outdated embedded-device firmware. It does not identify OTA as the update method or specify insecure services and expired components as the defects repaired. (LLM, conf=0.85)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Therefore, attackers can assemble beacon frames themselves, send malicious beacon frames to a device, and define the wake-up cycle to be very short so that the device wakes up frequently, thus speeding up the battery loss of class B devices [64].”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [64] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Data Collection section describes rogue-AP beacon frames that disrupt affected Wi-Fi stations, supporting the claim that attackers can send harmful beacons. It does not describe setting a short wake-up cycle or accelerating battery loss in class B devices; searches for those terms found no supporting passage. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
18 more claims
Create a free account to see all 124 claims and to verify the 1 reference still open.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 80
- It may state two separate claims as one. 67
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ B. Communication Protocol Privacy Security · p. 12
“Novo et al. [72] found that by monitoring the ZigBee network, they could obtain some useful network layer commands and use these commands to launch selective RF and spoofing attacks.”
§ IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. X, NO. X, 2023 · p. 23
“[72] Novo. O, " Blockchain Meets IoT: An Architecture for Scalable Access Management in IoT, " IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 1184-1195, 2018.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ B. Application of Artificial Intelligence and IoT · p. 16
“Zhang et al. [97] proposed an intelligent IoT system for smart home environment monitoring and control. The data mining method based on a Bayesian classifier is used to predict the possible faults of intelligent devices and find the optimal solution.”
§ IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. X, NO. X, 2023 · p. 24
“[97] X. Zhang, M. Hu, J. Xia, T. Wei, M. Chen, and S. Hu, "Efficient Federated Learning for Cloud-Based AIoT Applications, " IEEE T. Comput Aid D. , vol. 40, no. 11, pp. 2211-2223, 2021.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ B. Application of Artificial Intelligence and IoT · p. 16
“Kang et al. [96] developed a home robot that can be remotely controlled by smartphones. The robot provides housekeeping services and can realize remote video search, home appliance control and indoor security through smartphones.”
§ IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. X, NO. X, 2023 · p. 24
“[96] J. Kang, "Communication-Efficient and Cross-Chain Empowered Federated Learning for Artificial Intelligence of Things, " IEEE T. Netw Sci Eng. , vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 2966-2977, 2022.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ C. AI Integrates with IoT Privacy Security Protection · p. 16
“Wang et al. [101] proposed a blockchain-based large-scale data collection intelligent framework to solve the computational overhead and credibility problems in IoT data collection, which included a collaboration verification protocol, an intelligent trust management model, a hierarchical data aggregation strategy, and a blockchain-based IoT data management scheme.”
§ IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. X, NO. X, 2023 · p. 24
“[101]C. Wang, C. Jiang, J. Wang, S. Shen, S. Guo, and P. Zhang, "Blockchain-aided network resource orchestration in intelligent Internet of Things," IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 10, no. 7, pp. 6151-6163, Apr. 2023.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ B. Firmware Privacy Security Analysis · p. 9
“Zandberg et al. [51] collected a large number of firmware programs, designed a distributed architecture to unpack and perform simple static analysis, and implemented an engine to compare and determine the similarity between all objects in the dataset”
§ IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. X, NO. X, 2023 · p. 23
“[51] K. Zandberg, K. Schleiser, and E. Baccelli, "Secure Firmware Updates for Constrained IoT Devices Using Open Standards: A Reality Check, " IEEE Access., vol. 7, pp. 71907-71920, 2019.”
7 more findings
Create a free account to see every finding of this check.
Citations
Cites
Zero-Shot Learning—A Comprehensive Evaluation of the Good, the Bad and the Ugly
Xian, Y., Lampert, C. H., Schiele, B., & Akata, Z. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence · doi:10.1109/tpami.2018.2857768 · Cited by 1,678
Blockchain Meets IoT: An Architecture for Scalable Access Management in IoT
Novo, O. (2018) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2812239 · Cited by 1,318 · cited 2×
“Key cracking usually starts from the pairing process of the device, for example, by eavesdropping on the key during the ZigBee pairing process [70].”
BackgroundMethodSmart contract-based access control for the internet of things
Zhang, Y., Kasahara, S., Shen, Y., Jiang, X., & Wan, J. (2019) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2847705 · Cited by 788
A Survey on Federated Learning for Resource-Constrained IoT Devices
Imteaj, A., Thakker, U., Wang, S., Li, J., & Amini, M. H. (2022) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2021.3095077 · Cited by 774 · cited 1×
“On the basis of in-depth research and a summary of the status of security research for typical application scenarios of the IoT, we pointed out the security challenges faced by IoT security and identified future directions for security technology research [116].”
BackgroundIoT Security Techniques Based on Machine Learning: How Do IoT Devices Use AI to Enhance Security?
Xiao, L., Wan, X., Lu, X., Zhang, Y., & Wu, D. (2018) · IEEE Signal Processing Magazine · doi:10.1109/msp.2018.2825478 · Cited by 681
Cellular, Wide-Area, and Non-Terrestrial IoT: A Survey on 5G Advances and the Road Toward 6G
Vaezi, M., Azari, A., Khosravirad, S. R., Shirvanimoghaddam, M., Azari, M. M., Chasaki, D., & Popovski, P. (2022) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2022.3151028 · Cited by 631
Differential Privacy Techniques for Cyber Physical Systems: A Survey
Hassan, M. U., Rehmani, M. H., & Chen, J. (2020) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2944748 · Cited by 564
A Survey on Indoor Positioning Systems for IoT-Based Applications
Farahsari, P. S., Farahzadi, A., Rezazadeh, J., & Bagheri, A. (2022) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2022.3149048 · Cited by 546
Challenges, Applications, and Future of Wireless Sensors in Internet of Things: A Review
Jamshed, M. A., Ali, K., Abbasi, Q. H., Imran, M. A., & Ur-Rehman, M. (2022) · IEEE Sensors Journal · doi:10.1109/jsen.2022.3148128 · Cited by 495
Secure attribute-based data sharing for resource-limited users in cloud computing
Li, J., Zhang, Y., Chen, X., & Xiang, Y. (2018) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.007 · Cited by 461
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- 2020, Firmadyne
Cited by
Vivek Menon, U., Kumaravelu, V. B., Vinoth Kumar, C., Rammohan, A., Chinnadurai, S., Venkatesan, R., Hai, H., & Selvaprabhu, P. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3551750 · Cited by 189
“These resource-constrained devices are typified as devices with limited memory, power resources, processing, and storage capabilities [45].”
Blockchain Technology for IoT Security and Trust: A Comprehensive SLR
Almarri, S., & Aljughaiman, A. (2024) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su162310177 · Cited by 114
Wazid, M., Singh, J., Pandey, C., Sherratt, R. S., Das, A. K., Giri, D., & Park, Y. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems · doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3525505 · Cited by 77
“This poses a challenge in compiling a comprehensive inventory of all the elements that necessitate security and management [18].”
Transformer-based knowledge distillation for explainable intrusion detection system
AL-Nomasy, N., Alamri, A., Aljuhani, A., et al. (2025) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2025.104417 · Cited by 30
A Survey of Efficient Lightweight Cryptography for Power-Constrained Microcontrollers
Soto-Cruz, J. A., Ruiz-Ibarra, E. C., Castillo, J. V., Espinoza-Ruiz, A., Castillo-Atoche, A., & Mass-Sanchez, J. (2024) · Technologies · doi:10.3390/technologies13010003 · Cited by 62
Metadata
- Authors
- Sun, P., Shen, S., Wan, Y., Wu, Z., Fang, Z., & Gao, X.-Z.
- Affiliations
- Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shaoxing University, Shaoxing, China
- Huzhou Normal University (CN)
- Shaoxing University (CN)
- University of Eastern Finland (FI)
- Venue
- IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Published
- 2024-11-01
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 21
- Pages
- 34567-34591
- ISSN
- 2327-4662 (ISSN-L)
- 2372-2541
- OpenAlex
- W4392397286
- Cited by
- 172
- References
- 143
- Citations by year
- 2026: 66 · 2025: 81 · 2024: 25
- FWCI
- 28.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- erepo.uef.fi
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Internet of Things Journal (publishedVersion)
- UEF eRepo (University of Eastern Finland) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China (LQZS24E050001)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Internet of Things and AI
- Keywords
- Internet of Things security, IoT privacy, network security threats, risk assessment, fuzzing, program verification, machine learning for security, IoT protocols, access control models, blockchain, data privacy law, privacy preservation
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-29, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-29 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/jiot.2024.3372518
- The paper
- Sun, P., Shen, S., Wan, Y., Wu, Z., Fang, Z., & Gao, X.-Z. (2024). A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends. IEEE Internet of Things Journal. https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2024.3372518
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.