The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Modeling and Mitigating Impact of False Data Injection Attacks on Automatic Generation Control
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of false data injection (FDI) attacks on automatic generation control (AGC), a fundamental control system used in all power grids to maintain the grid frequency at a nominal value. Attacks on the sensor measurements for AGC can cause frequency excursion that triggers remedial actions, such as disconnecting customer loads or generators, leading to blackouts, and potentially costly equipment damage. We derive an attack impact model and analyze an optimal attack, consisting of a series of FDIs that minimizes the remaining time until the onset of disruptive remedial actions, leaving the shortest time for the grid to counteract. We show that, based on eavesdropped sensor data and a few feasible-to-obtain system constants, the attacker can learn the attack impact model and achieve the optimal attack in practice. This paper provides essential understanding on the limits of physical impact of the FDIs on power grids, and provides an analysis framework to guide the protection of sensor data links. For countermeasures, we develop efficient algorithms to detect the attack, estimate which sensor data links are under attack, and mitigate attack impact. Our analysis and algorithms are validated by experiments on a physical 16-bus power system test bed and extensive simulations based on a 37-bus power system model.
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Citations
Cites
Vulnerability Assessment of AC State Estimation With Respect to False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks
Hug, G., & Giampapa, J. A. (2012) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2012.2195338 · Cited by 595 · cited 1×
“(1) should be replaced by the bypass condition of ACSE's BDD (e.g., [32]).”
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Cited by
Ghiasi, M., Niknam, T., Wang, Z., Mehrandezh, M., Dehghani, M., & Ghadimi, N. (2023) · Electric Power Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.epsr.2022.108975 · Cited by 494
Zio, E. (2018) · Reliability Engineering & System Safety · doi:10.1016/j.ress.2018.04.020 · Cited by 401
Attack detection and identification for automatic generation control systems
Ameli, A., Hooshyar, A., El-Saadany, E. F., & Youssef, A. M. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2018.2810161 · Cited by 222
State of the art of cyber-physical systems security: An automatic control perspective
Zacchia Lun, Y., D’Innocenzo, A., Smarra, F., Malavolta, I., & Di Benedetto, M. D. (2019) · Journal of Systems and Software · doi:10.1016/j.jss.2018.12.006 · Cited by 211
“Leverage point attack Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Tan et al. (2014)”
BackgroundDenial of service attack and defense method on load frequency control system
Li, Y., Zhang, P., & Ma, L. (2019) · Journal of the Franklin Institute · doi:10.1016/j.jfranklin.2019.08.036 · Cited by 78
Metadata
- Authors
- Tan, R., Nguyen, H. H., Foo, E. Y. S., Yau, D. K. Y., Kalbarczyk, Z., Iyer, R. K., & Gooi, H. B.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Published
- 2017-07
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1609-1624
- ISSN
- 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
- 1556-6021
- OpenAlex
- W2593244526
- Cited by
- 218
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 14.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- The paper
- Tan, R., Nguyen, H. H., Foo, E. Y. S., Yau, D. K. Y., Kalbarczyk, Z., Iyer, R. K., & Gooi, H. B. (2017). Modeling and Mitigating Impact of False Data Injection Attacks on Automatic Generation Control. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2017.2676721
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