SysFlow: Toward a Programmable Zero Trust Framework for System Security
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Zero Trust, as an emerging trend of cybersecurity paradigms in modern infrastructure (e.g., enterprise, cloud, edge, IoT, and 5G), is moving security defenses from static and perimeter-based control systems to focus on users and resources with no assumption of implicit trust. However, the current Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) mainly focuses on the network security and lacks in-depth considerations on system-level security policies and abstractions, which leaves the realization of the principle incomplete. To bridge the gap, we propose an innovativeprogrammablesystem security framework called SYSFLOW to enable unified, dynamic, and fine-grained Zero Trust security control for system resources. SYSFLOW introduces a novelsystem flowabstraction to modelsystem activitiesacross the entire infrastructure, and provides a system-level data plane and control plane separation and abstraction. The new logically centralized controller accommodates a unifiedprogrammablePolicy Decision Point (PDP) that acquires a holistic view of system behaviors for controlling system resource accesses by translated programmable security policies into system flow rules. The SYSFLOW data plane, acting as Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), enforces translated system flow rules, which can be updated dynamically and facilitate fine-grained responsive actions. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and scalability of SYSFLOW, which addresses the security issues in various scenarios with a minor performance overhead.
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Citations
Cites
The EigenTrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
Kamvar, S. D., Schlosser, M. T., & Garcia-Molina, H. (2003) · Proceedings of the twelfth international conference on World Wide Web - WWW '03 · doi:10.1145/775152.775242 · Cited by 3,362
Rose, S., Borchert, O., Mitchell, S., & Connelly, S. (2020) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-207 · Cited by 1,174
HOLMES: Real-Time APT Detection through Correlation of Suspicious Information Flows
Milajerdi, S. M., Gjomemo, R., Eshete, B., Sekar, R., & Venkatakrishnan, V. N. (2019) · 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2019.00026 · Cited by 573
(2013) · doi:10.1145/2342441.2342452 · Cited by 426 · cited 1×
“The verification tools for S YS F LOW architecture as a guiding principle to verify the reference monitor and the whole framework can be built either on flow control references between the control plane and the data plane or on each plane just like many SDN approaches [27], [33].”
MethodSLEUTH: Real-time Attack Scenario Reconstruction from COTS Audit Data
Hossain, M. N., Milajerdi, S. M., Wang, J., Eshete, B., Gjomemo, R., Sekar, R., Stoller, S., & Venkatakrishnan, V. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.02062 · Cited by 176 · cited 1×
“Also, several studies [29], [37], [45] also target real-time attack story constructions from system-level logs.”
Background
Cited by
Lv, F., Wang, H., Pan, Z., Sun, R., Si, S., Zhang, W., Lv, S., & Sun, L. (2025) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2025.111459 · Cited by 12
SecT: A Zero-Trust Framework for Secure Remote Access in Next-Generation Industrial Networks
Asim, M., Tariq, N., Awad, A. I., Waheed, F., Ullah, U., & Murtaza, G. (2025) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/jsac.2025.3560015 · Cited by 10
A three-tier microsegmentation framework for enterprise networks under Zero Trust Architecture
N.N., H., Krishnan, P., Jain, K., Saudagar, A. K. J., P., P., & Poonia, R. C. (2026) · Alexandria Engineering Journal · doi:10.1016/j.aej.2026.03.014 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Hong, S., Xu, L., Huang, J., Li, H., Hu, H., & Gu, G.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Published
- 2023
- Volume
- 18
- Pages
- 2794-2809
- ISSN
- 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
- 1556-6021
- OpenAlex
- W4362496414
- Cited by
- 53
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 4.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Hong, S., Xu, L., Huang, J., Li, H., Hu, H., & Gu, G. (2023). SysFlow: Toward a Programmable Zero Trust Framework for System Security. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2023.3264152
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