Cited by 32Smart Grid Security and ResilienceNetwork Security and Intrusion DetectionPower System Optimization and Stability

Smart cyber-attack diagnosis and mitigation in a wind farm network operator

Badihi, Hamed, Jadidi, Saeedreza, Yu, Ziquan, Zhang, Youmin, Lu, Ningyun·2023·IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics

Abstract

With the rise of wind energy production in global power generation, wind farm facilities are becoming increasingly attractive targets for malicious attacks, in particular those affecting wind farm network operators’ cybersubsystems and functionalities. Given the significance of this problem, this article proposes a novel anomaly-based intrusion detection and diagnosis system to carry out in-line monitoring as with firewalls. Also, an innovative cyberattack-resilient active power control is designed to responsively mitigate the impacts of cyberattacks on the safe regulation of active power from wind farms. An offshore wind farm benchmark is used to implement and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed solutions in the presence of wind turbulences, measurement noises and realistic smart cyberattack scenarios.

Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1109/tii.2022.3228686

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  • The distribution of datasets shows a strong reliance on SWaT and WADI for benchmarking prediction-residual-based methods, with additional evidence from custom-built avionics, robotics, temperature-control, offshore wind farm, and simulation-based CPS testbeds.

    “Finally, the distribution of datasets shows a strong reliance on SWaT and WADI for benchmarking prediction-residual-based methods, with additional evidence from custombuilt avionics, robotics, temperature-control, offshore wind farm, and simulation-based CPS testbeds [67-73,75,76].”
  • Under ramp attacks on frequency measurements or ramp/scaling attacks on the required active power commands sent by the WFNO, only the residual corresponding to the attacked signal increases selectively.

    “Under normal operation, both residuals remain small; however, under ramp attacks on frequency measurements or ramp/scaling attacks on the required active power commands sent by the WFNO, only the residual corresponding to the attacked signal increases selectively.”
  • The method by Badihi et al. [73] detects anomalies by analyzing which residual channel exceeds its threshold and uses the residuals to automatically adjust the active power control input, thereby detecting and mitigating cyberattacks early before the grid frequency significantly deviates from its allowable range.

    “The method thus detects anomalies by analyzing which residual channel exceeds its threshold and uses the residuals to automatically adjust the active power control input, thereby detecting and mitigating cyberattacks early-before the grid frequency significantly deviates from its allowable range.”
  • Prediction-residual-oriented methods are powerful for detecting subtle and coordinated process anomalies, including multi-point stealthy attacks that forge SCADA histories or slowly drive the system toward unsafe states.

    “Third, in terms of detection capability and failure modes, the results indicate that prediction-residual-oriented methods are powerful for detecting subtle and coordinated process anomalies, including multi-point stealthy attacks that forge SCADA histories or slowly drive the system toward unsafe states [69,72,73,75,76].”
  • In many works, a model predicts the next-step sensor or control-signal values and computes prediction residuals, or derives an anomaly score that functions as a probabilistic or density-based residual, so that small but systematic deviations in process dynamics can be detected even when they are not visible at the network layer.

    “In many of these works, a model predicts the next-step sensor or control-signal values and computes prediction residuals, or derives an anomaly score that functions as a probabilistic or density-based residual, so that small but systematic deviations in process dynamics can be detected even when they are not visible at the network layer [67,69,70,72,73,75].”

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References 20 · Cited by 32

Authors
Badihi, H., Jadidi, S., Yu, Z., Zhang, Y., & Lu, N.
Affiliations
  • Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (CN)
  • Concordia University (CA)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
Published
2023-09
Volume
19
Issue
9
Pages
9468-9478
ISSN
  • 1551-3203 (ISSN-L)
  • 1941-0050
OpenAlex
W4313124820
Cited by
32
References
20
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 4
FWCI
2.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (62003166, 61833013)
  • Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power System Optimization and Stability
Keywords
intrusion detection, anomaly-based detection, active power control, cyberattack mitigation, cyberattack resilience, in-line monitoring, offshore wind farms, wind energy systems, power system security

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