Smart cyber-attack diagnosis and mitigation in a wind farm network operator
Abstract
With the rise of wind energy production in global power generation, wind farm facilities are becoming increasingly attractive targets for malicious attacks, in particular those affecting wind farm network operators’ cybersubsystems and functionalities. Given the significance of this problem, this article proposes a novel anomaly-based intrusion detection and diagnosis system to carry out in-line monitoring as with firewalls. Also, an innovative cyberattack-resilient active power control is designed to responsively mitigate the impacts of cyberattacks on the safe regulation of active power from wind farms. An offshore wind farm benchmark is used to implement and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed solutions in the presence of wind turbulences, measurement noises and realistic smart cyberattack scenarios.
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The distribution of datasets shows a strong reliance on SWaT and WADI for benchmarking prediction-residual-based methods, with additional evidence from custom-built avionics, robotics, temperature-control, offshore wind farm, and simulation-based CPS testbeds.
“Finally, the distribution of datasets shows a strong reliance on SWaT and WADI for benchmarking prediction-residual-based methods, with additional evidence from custombuilt avionics, robotics, temperature-control, offshore wind farm, and simulation-based CPS testbeds [67-73,75,76].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [73]
Under ramp attacks on frequency measurements or ramp/scaling attacks on the required active power commands sent by the WFNO, only the residual corresponding to the attacked signal increases selectively.
“Under normal operation, both residuals remain small; however, under ramp attacks on frequency measurements or ramp/scaling attacks on the required active power commands sent by the WFNO, only the residual corresponding to the attacked signal increases selectively.”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [73]
The method by Badihi et al. [73] detects anomalies by analyzing which residual channel exceeds its threshold and uses the residuals to automatically adjust the active power control input, thereby detecting and mitigating cyberattacks early before the grid frequency significantly deviates from its allowable range.
“The method thus detects anomalies by analyzing which residual channel exceeds its threshold and uses the residuals to automatically adjust the active power control input, thereby detecting and mitigating cyberattacks early-before the grid frequency significantly deviates from its allowable range.”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [73]
Prediction-residual-oriented methods are powerful for detecting subtle and coordinated process anomalies, including multi-point stealthy attacks that forge SCADA histories or slowly drive the system toward unsafe states.
“Third, in terms of detection capability and failure modes, the results indicate that prediction-residual-oriented methods are powerful for detecting subtle and coordinated process anomalies, including multi-point stealthy attacks that forge SCADA histories or slowly drive the system toward unsafe states [69,72,73,75,76].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [73]
In many works, a model predicts the next-step sensor or control-signal values and computes prediction residuals, or derives an anomaly score that functions as a probabilistic or density-based residual, so that small but systematic deviations in process dynamics can be detected even when they are not visible at the network layer.
“In many of these works, a model predicts the next-step sensor or control-signal values and computes prediction residuals, or derives an anomaly score that functions as a probabilistic or density-based residual, so that small but systematic deviations in process dynamics can be detected even when they are not visible at the network layer [67,69,70,72,73,75].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [73]
Process data are particularly suitable for attacks that perturb the physical process state while keeping network-level statistics relatively unchanged, such as false data injection, malicious command or parameter manipulation, process-oriented attacks, and stealthy drifts in sensor trajectories.
“First, process data are particularly suitable for attacks that perturb the physical process state while keeping network-level statistics relatively unchanged-such as false data injection, malicious command or parameter manipulation, process-oriented attacks, and stealthy drifts in sensor trajectories [67,69-73,75,76].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [73]
Badihi et al. [73] proposed a prediction-residual-based cyberattack diagnosis and mitigation method that simultaneously monitors grid frequency and active power reference signals observed by the Wind Farm Network Operator (WFNO) for offshore wind farm data.
“For offshore wind farm data, Badihi et al. [73] proposed a prediction-residual-based cyberattack diagnosis and mitigation method that simultaneously monitors grid frequency and active power reference signals observed by the Wind Farm Network Operator (WFNO).”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [73]
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References 20 · Cited by 32
- Authors
- Badihi, H., Jadidi, S., Yu, Z., Zhang, Y., & Lu, N.
- Affiliations
- Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (CN)
- Concordia University (CA)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
- Published
- 2023-09
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 9468-9478
- ISSN
- 1551-3203 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-0050
- OpenAlex
- W4313124820
- Cited by
- 32
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 4
- FWCI
- 2.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (62003166, 61833013)
- Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power System Optimization and Stability
- Keywords
- intrusion detection, anomaly-based detection, active power control, cyberattack mitigation, cyberattack resilience, in-line monitoring, offshore wind farms, wind energy systems, power system security
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