ICS anomaly detection based on sensor patterns and actuator rules in spatiotemporal dependency
Abstract
Data-driven methods, such as deep learning, are widely adopted to detect cyberattacks for Industrial control systems (ICSs). Due to the neglect of entity spatial relationships (ESR), however, there is a potential discrepancy between the learned device topology and the real physical process. Meanwhile, existing methods confuse sensor patterns, actuator rules, and some interference within spatiotemporal dependence, suffering from undetected attack issue. To achieve precise detection without using design knowledge, we propose a sensor-actuator separated anomaly detection method (SA2) that distinguishes sensor patterns and actuator rules, constructing prediction models for sensors (PM-SEN) and actuators (PM-ACT) separately. Moreover, we propose an ESR-based topology construction method for providing process-conformed topology and an attack span-based evaluation method for validating the undetected attack issue. The experimental results show that SA2 outperforms all baselines in the F1 score, effectively detecting all attacks (zero undetected rate), compared to an optimal baseline with an undetected rate of close to 50%.
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The dataset distribution for operational-consistency-oriented methods shows evaluation across a relatively diverse set of CPS domains, including water-treatment testbeds (SWaT, WADI), vehicle OBD-II datasets, and power-system simulations.
“Finally, the dataset distribution shows that operational-consistency-oriented methods are evaluated across a relatively diverse set of CPS domains, including water-treatment testbeds (SWaT, WADI), vehicle OBD-II datasets, and power-system simulations [111-118].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [113]
Operational-consistency-based methods explicitly encode process constraints, control logic, and admissible state transitions, and treat violations of such rules as primary anomaly cues, unlike purely data-driven prediction-residual or reconstruction-error approaches.
“First, unlike purely data-driven prediction-residual or reconstruction-error approaches, these methods explicitly encode process constraints, control logic, and admissible state transitions, and treat violations of such rules as primary anomaly cues [111-118].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [113]
Several studies emphasize the importance of automatic rule extraction, adaptive updating of operational profiles, and careful coordination between rule-based and ML-based components.
“Several studies therefore emphasize the importance of automatic rule extraction, adaptive updating of operational profiles, and careful coordination between rule-based and ML-based components [113,114,117].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [113]
By checking whether actuator commands, sensor responses, and event sequences are physically feasible and logically consistent, operational-consistency-based methods can detect cyber-physical attacks and stealthy manipulations that only slightly perturb statistical patterns but induce clear inconsistencies with process and control laws (e.g., false data injection, command and control tampering, re
“By checking whether actuator commands, sensor responses, and event sequences are physically feasible and logically consistent. they can detect cyber-physical attacks and stealthy manipulations that only slightly perturb statistical patterns but induce clear inconsistencies with process and control laws-such as false data injection, command and control tampering, replay, ramp-style stealth attacks,”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [113]
Because operational-consistency-based detectors focus on physical and logical feasibility rather than specific attack signatures, they can flag previously unseen attacks that violate process interlocks, causal relationships, or power-balance constraints.
“Because they focus on physical and logical feasibility rather than on specific attack signatures, they can flag previously unseen attacks that nevertheless violate process interlocks, causal relationships, or power-balance constraints [113,114,117,118].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [113]
Hybrid operational-consistency frameworks combine rule-based consistency checks with supervised learners (e.g., decision trees, XGBoost, CNN-LSTM, DNNs), using operational rules either as a first-stage filter or as additional features to improve the robustness of data-driven classifiers.
“On the other side, hybrid frameworks combine these rule-based consistency checks with supervised learners such as decision trees, XGBoost, CNN-LSTM, and DNNs, using operational rules either as a first-stage filter or as additional features to improve the robustness of data-driven classifiers [112-114,117,118].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [113]
Rule-centric operational-consistency approaches (e.g., Bayesian-network/FSM models, PLC-command validation tools, process-monitoring modules with explicit sensor/actuator rules) leverage hand-crafted or automatically extracted constraints to reject logically impossible operations and abnormal event sequences.
“On one side, Bayesian-network/FSM models, PLC-command validation tools, and process-monitoring modules with explicit sensor/actuator rules leverage hand-crafted or automatically extracted constraints to reject logically impossible operations and abnormal event sequences [111-113,117].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [113]
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References 32 · Cited by 38
- Authors
- Cai, J., Wei, Z., & Luo, J.
- Affiliations
- Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University (CN)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
- Published
- 2024-08
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 10647-10656
- ISSN
- 1551-3203 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-0050
- OpenAlex
- W4396941583
- Cited by
- 38
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 12 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 5
- FWCI
- 6.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Key R&D Program (2019YFB1804403)
- Innovation Popularization Field of Science and Technology Department of Guangdong Province (2023A1414020053)
- Provincial Scientific Research Project of General Universities of Guangdong Province (2021ZDJS026)
- Key Project of Guangdong Provincial Department of Education (2021ZDZX1031)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Fault Detection and Control Systems
- Keywords
- industrial control systems, anomaly detection, cyberattack detection, spatiotemporal dependencies
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