Cited by 38Network Security and Intrusion DetectionSmart Grid Security and ResilienceFault Detection and Control Systems

ICS anomaly detection based on sensor patterns and actuator rules in spatiotemporal dependency

Cai, Jun, Wei, Zeheng, Luo, Jianzhen·2024·IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics

Abstract

Data-driven methods, such as deep learning, are widely adopted to detect cyberattacks for Industrial control systems (ICSs). Due to the neglect of entity spatial relationships (ESR), however, there is a potential discrepancy between the learned device topology and the real physical process. Meanwhile, existing methods confuse sensor patterns, actuator rules, and some interference within spatiotemporal dependence, suffering from undetected attack issue. To achieve precise detection without using design knowledge, we propose a sensor-actuator separated anomaly detection method (SA2) that distinguishes sensor patterns and actuator rules, constructing prediction models for sensors (PM-SEN) and actuators (PM-ACT) separately. Moreover, we propose an ESR-based topology construction method for providing process-conformed topology and an attack span-based evaluation method for validating the undetected attack issue. The experimental results show that SA2 outperforms all baselines in the F1 score, effectively detecting all attacks (zero undetected rate), compared to an optimal baseline with an undetected rate of close to 50%.

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Crossref · 10.1109/tii.2024.3393528

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  • The dataset distribution for operational-consistency-oriented methods shows evaluation across a relatively diverse set of CPS domains, including water-treatment testbeds (SWaT, WADI), vehicle OBD-II datasets, and power-system simulations.

    “Finally, the dataset distribution shows that operational-consistency-oriented methods are evaluated across a relatively diverse set of CPS domains, including water-treatment testbeds (SWaT, WADI), vehicle OBD-II datasets, and power-system simulations [111-118].”
  • Operational-consistency-based methods explicitly encode process constraints, control logic, and admissible state transitions, and treat violations of such rules as primary anomaly cues, unlike purely data-driven prediction-residual or reconstruction-error approaches.

    “First, unlike purely data-driven prediction-residual or reconstruction-error approaches, these methods explicitly encode process constraints, control logic, and admissible state transitions, and treat violations of such rules as primary anomaly cues [111-118].”
  • Several studies emphasize the importance of automatic rule extraction, adaptive updating of operational profiles, and careful coordination between rule-based and ML-based components.

    “Several studies therefore emphasize the importance of automatic rule extraction, adaptive updating of operational profiles, and careful coordination between rule-based and ML-based components [113,114,117].”
  • By checking whether actuator commands, sensor responses, and event sequences are physically feasible and logically consistent, operational-consistency-based methods can detect cyber-physical attacks and stealthy manipulations that only slightly perturb statistical patterns but induce clear inconsistencies with process and control laws (e.g., false data injection, command and control tampering, re

    “By checking whether actuator commands, sensor responses, and event sequences are physically feasible and logically consistent. they can detect cyber-physical attacks and stealthy manipulations that only slightly perturb statistical patterns but induce clear inconsistencies with process and control laws-such as false data injection, command and control tampering, replay, ramp-style stealth attacks,”
  • Because operational-consistency-based detectors focus on physical and logical feasibility rather than specific attack signatures, they can flag previously unseen attacks that violate process interlocks, causal relationships, or power-balance constraints.

    “Because they focus on physical and logical feasibility rather than on specific attack signatures, they can flag previously unseen attacks that nevertheless violate process interlocks, causal relationships, or power-balance constraints [113,114,117,118].”

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References 32 · Cited by 38

Authors
Cai, J., Wei, Z., & Luo, J.
Affiliations
Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University (CN)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
Published
2024-08
Volume
20
Issue
8
Pages
10647-10656
ISSN
  • 1551-3203 (ISSN-L)
  • 1941-0050
OpenAlex
W4396941583
Cited by
38
References
32
Citations by year
2026: 12 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 5
FWCI
6.29
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • National Key R&D Program (2019YFB1804403)
  • Innovation Popularization Field of Science and Technology Department of Guangdong Province (2023A1414020053)
  • Provincial Scientific Research Project of General Universities of Guangdong Province (2021ZDJS026)
  • Key Project of Guangdong Provincial Department of Education (2021ZDZX1031)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Fault Detection and Control Systems
Keywords
industrial control systems, anomaly detection, cyberattack detection, spatiotemporal dependencies

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