Cited by 15Coding theory and cryptographyCryptography and Residue ArithmeticPolynomial and algebraic computation

The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Polynomial Time Key-Recovery Attack on High Rate Random Alternant Codes

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Bardet, Magali, Mora, Rocco, Tillich, Jean-Pierre·2024·IEEE Transactions on Information Theory

Abstract

A long standing open question is whether the distinguisher of high rate alternant codes or Goppa codes from Faugère, Gauthier-Umaña, Otmani, Perret, and Tillich in 2011 can be turned into an algorithm recovering the algebraic structure of such codes from the mere knowledge of an arbitrary generator matrix of it. This would allow to break the McEliece scheme as soon as the code rate is large enough and would break all instances of the CFS signature scheme. We give for the first time a positive answer for this problem when the code isa generic alternant codeand when the code field sizeqis small:q∈ {2, 3} and forallregimes of other parameters for which the aforementioned distinguisher works. This breakthrough has been obtained by two different ingredients: (i) a way of using code shortening and the component-wise product of codes to derive from the original alternant code a sequence of alternant codes of decreasing degree up to getting an alternant code of degree 3 (with a multiplier and support related to those of the original alternant code); (ii) an original Gröbner basis approach which takes into account the non standard constraints on the multiplier and support of an alternant code which recovers in polynomial time the relevant algebraic structure of an alternant code of degree 3 from the mere knowledge of a basis for it.

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  • During the fourth round, there has been significant progress in cryptanalysis techniques applicable to key recovery and to distinguishing a Goppa code from a random linear code.

    “During the fourth round, there has been significant progress in cryptanalysis techniques that are applicable to key recovery and the related problem of distinguishing a Goppa code from a random linear code [46, 66-69].”

    From Status report on the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process (2025) · cites this paper as [67]

    The Introduction describes advances in key-recovery attacks and a method for distinguishing high-rate Goppa codes from random linear codes. The paper’s contribution concerns key recovery for generic alternant codes, while §3.2 explains an obstacle to applying that approach to Goppa codes. The cited passages do not establish that these advances occurred during a ‘fourth round.’ (LLM, conf=0.83)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Algebraic attacks targeting the structure of Goppa codes that achieve either key recovery or a distinguisher from a random linear code have remained an active area of research.

    “Nonetheless, algebraic attacks that target the structure of Goppa codes and achieve either key recovery or a distinguisher from a random linear code have remained an active area of research [46, 65-69].”

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Research works printed but not linked: 40

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Metadata

Authors
Bardet, M., Mora, R., & Tillich, J.-P.
Affiliations
  • Laboratoire d'Informatique, du Traitement de l'Information et des Systèmes (FR)
  • Helmholtz Center for Information Security (DE)
  • Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique (FR)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Published
2024-06
Volume
70
Issue
6
Pages
4492-4511
ISSN
  • 0018-9448 (ISSN-L)
  • 1557-9654
OpenAlex
W4389104608
Cited by
15
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 4
FWCI
1.33
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Transactions on Information Theory (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
Funders
  • Plan France 2030 Program
  • French Agence Nationale de la Recherche project (ANR-22-PETQ-0008 PQ-TLS)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics › Coding theory and cryptography
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computational Theory and Mathematics › Polynomial and algebraic computation
Keywords
key recovery attack, Goppa codes, McEliece cryptosystem, code shortening, Gröbner bases, polynomial-time attack, code rate, small field size

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