An intrusion detection method based on machine learning and state observer for train-ground communication systems
Abstract
The communication-based train control (CBTC) system is a typical cyber physical system in urban rail transit. The train-ground communication system is a very important subsystem of the CBTC system and uses the wireless communication protocols to transmit control commands. However, it faces some potential information security risks. To ensure information security of the train-ground communication system, an intrusion detection method based on machine learning and state observer is proposed to detect and recognize various attacks in this paper. The detection system not only detects the anomalies of the wireless network data, but also detects the anomalies of the train physical states. This method includes two layers. The first layer is used to detect and identify wireless network attacks based on machine learning algorithms, such as the random forest algorithm and the gradient boosted decision tree algorithm. The second layer is used to detect the abnormal physical state of train operation based on a state observer. By combining the results of the above two layers, a comprehensive intrusion detection result is given. The simulation results show that the proposed method is effective and practical.
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Many ensemble and decision-fusion frameworks perform decision-level fusion rather than strict feature-level fusion, aggregating per-model outputs via voting schemes or risk evaluation engines; this design simplifies deployment across diverse ICS domains because existing detectors can be reused while the fusion logic is tuned to plant-specific safety and criticality requirements.
“Second, many frameworks perform decision-level fusion rather than strict feature-level fusion, aggregating per-model outputs via voting schemes or risk evaluation engines; this design simplifies deployment across diverse ICS domains because existing detectors can be reused while the fusion logic is tuned to plant-specific safety and criticality requirements [133-136].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [136]
Gao et al. [136]'s cyber-physical correlation framework combines both layers' outputs to verify whether detected network attacks have a tangible impact on train control, providing an integrated anomaly assessment over hybrid data.
“Finally, a cyber-physical correlation framework combines both layers' outputs to verify whether detected network attacks have a tangible impact on train control, providing an integrated anomaly assessment over hybrid data.”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [136]
Gao et al. [136] proposed a cyber-physical hybrid anomaly detection method that couples machine-learning-based network intrusion detection with physical state observation, using a self-constructed train-ground wireless communication simulation dataset.
“Gao et al. [136] proposed a cyber-physical hybrid anomaly detection method that couples machine-learning-based network intrusion detection with physical state observation, using a self-constructed train-ground wireless communication simulation dataset.”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [136]
Several ensemble and decision-fusion works go beyond pure 'detection accuracy' and link fused anomaly decisions to higher-level concepts-such as safety integrity, risk scores, or physical impact validation-thereby prioritizing responses to attacks that threaten equipment and process safety instead of treating all alerts as equally important.
“Third, several works go beyond pure 'detection accuracy' and link fused anomaly decisions to higher-level concepts-such as safety integrity, risk scores, or physical impact validation-thereby prioritizing responses to attacks that threaten equipment and process safety instead of treating all alerts as equally important [134,136,137].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [136]
In Gao et al. [136], in an IEEE 802.11 wireless environment, network-layer traffic features-20 statistics including control fields, addresses, and retransmission rates-are used to train RF, GBDT, AdaBoost, and SVM classifiers for detecting DoS, deauthentication, and flooding attacks.
“In an IEEE 802.11 [141] wireless environment, network-layer traffic features-20 statistics including control fields, addresses, and retransmission rates-are used to train RF, GBDT, AdaBoost, and SVM classifiers for detecting DoS, deauthentication, and flooding attacks.”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [136]
In Gao et al. [136], at the physical layer, a train dynamics state observer computes residual between measured and estimated position/velocity to determine operational anomalies.
“At the physical layer, a train dynamics state observer computes residual between measured and estimated position/velocity to determine operational anomalies.”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [136]
Ensemble and decision-fusion-based hybrid data studies explicitly combine detectors with heterogeneous inductive biases-tree ensembles, kernel methods, deep sequence models, and state observers-so that cyber-layer traffic anomalies and physical-layer process deviations are jointly reflected in the final decision, improving robustness under noisy hybrid data and nonstationary operating regimes.
“First, they explicitly combine detectors with heterogeneous inductive biases-tree ensembles, kernel methods, deep sequence models, and state observers-so that cyber-layer traffic anomalies and physical-layer process deviations are jointly reflected in the final decision, improving robustness under noisy hybrid data and nonstationary operating regimes [133-137].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [136]
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- Authors
- Gao, B., Bu, B., Zhang, W., & Li, X.
- Affiliations
- Beijing Jiaotong University (CN)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
- Published
- 2022-07
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 6608-6620
- ISSN
- 1524-9050 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-0016
- OpenAlex
- W3131991398
- Cited by
- 62
- References
- 22
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 2
- FWCI
- 3.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Graduate Innovation Fund of Beijing Jiaotong University (I20JB00010)
- Innovation Fund Project of Beijing Traffic Control Technology (9907006507)
- Beijing Laboratory for Urban Mass Transit
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design › Transportation Systems and Safety
- Keywords
- intrusion detection, train-to-ground communication, CBTC, cyber-physical systems, urban rail transit, wireless network attacks, attack detection, state observer, random forest, gradient boosting decision tree, information security
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