Cited by 275Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)Smart Grid Security and ResilienceNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 155 of the 160 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Securing Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communication Platforms

Open access
Hasan, Monowar, Mohan, Sibin, Shimizu, Takayuki, Lu, Hongsheng·2020·IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles

Abstract

Modern vehicular wireless technology enables vehicles to exchange information at any time, from any place, to any network-forms the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication platforms. Despite benefits, V2X applications also face great challenges to security and privacy-a very valid concern since breaches are not uncommon in automotive communication networks and applications. In this survey, we provide an extensive overview of V2X ecosystem. We also review main security/privacy issues, current standardization activities and existing defense mechanisms proposed within the V2X domain. We then identified semantic gaps of existing security solutions and outline possible open issues.

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Crossref · 10.1109/tiv.2020.2987430

Cites

155 of 155 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 160 references

Research works printed but not linked: 19

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Metadata

Authors
Hasan, M., Mohan, S., Shimizu, T., & Lu, H.
Affiliations
  • University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (US)
  • Toyota Motor North America (United States) (US)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles
Published
2020-12
Volume
5
Issue
4
Pages
693-713
ISSN
  • 2379-8858 (ISSN-L)
  • 2379-8904
OpenAlex
W3016409148
Cited by
275
References
160
Citations by year
2026: 40 · 2025: 54 · 2024: 62 · 2023: 60 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 5
FWCI
10.22
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (NSF SaTC 1718952)
  • R&D InfoTech Labs
  • Toyota Motor North America, Inc. Any findings
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
vehicle-to-everything communication, V2X security, privacy, vehicular networks, automotive communication networks, security standardization, defense mechanisms

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