Comprehensive Privacy Analysis on Federated Recommender System Against Attribute Inference Attacks
Open accessAbstract
In recent years, recommender systems are crucially important for the delivery of personalized services that satisfy users’ preferences. With personalized recommendation services, users can enjoy a variety of recommendations such as movies, books, ads, restaurants, and more. Despite the great benefits, personalized recommendations typically require the collection of personal data for user modelling and analysis, which can make users susceptible to attribute inference attacks. Specifically, the vulnerability of existing centralized recommenders under attribute inference attacks leaves malicious attackers a backdoor to infer users’ private attributes, as the systems remember information of their training data (i.e., interaction data and side information). An emerging practice is to implement recommender systems in the federated setting, which enables all user devices to collaboratively learn a shared global recommender while keeping all the training data on device. However, the privacy issues in federated recommender systems have been rarely explored. In this paper, we first design a novel attribute inference attacker to perform a comprehensive privacy analysis of the GCN-based federated recommender models. The experimental results show that the vulnerability of each model component against attribute inference attack is varied, highlighting the need for new defense approaches. Therefore, we propose a novel adaptive privacy-preserving approach to protect users’ sensitive data in the presence of attribute inference attacks and meanwhile maximize the recommendation accuracy. Extensive experimental results on two real-world datasets validate the superior performance of our model on both recommendation effectiveness and resistance to inference attacks.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Various privacy preservation methodologies, such as randomization, differential privacy, secure multiparty computation, and homomorphic encryption, can be applied to build decentralized PPRS.
“To address these vulnerabilities, various privacy preservation methodologies, such as randomization, differential privacy, secure multiparty computation, and homomorphic encryption, can be applied to build decentralized PPRS [14, 129-132, 138, 139, 141].”
From A Deep Dive into Fairness, Bias, Threats, and Privacy in Recommender Systems: Insights and Future Research (2024) · cites this paper as [141]
Decentralized recommender systems remain vulnerable to threats such as inference attacks and differential attacks.
“Although decentralized RS inherently provides a privacy protocol, as users preserve their entire historical data, and even FedRec prioritizes user privacy over DCS, it remains vulnerable to threats such as inference attacks and differential attacks [105, 138-142].”
From A Deep Dive into Fairness, Bias, Threats, and Privacy in Recommender Systems: Insights and Future Research (2024) · cites this paper as [141]
Cites
Federated Learning With Differential Privacy: Algorithms and Performance Analysis
Wei, K., Li, J., Ding, M., Ma, C., Yang, H. H., Farokhi, F., Jin, S., Quek, T. Q. S., & Vincent Poor, H. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2020.2988575 · Cited by 2,400 · see citing works
Context-Aware Recommender Systems
Adomavicius, G., & Tuzhilin, A. (2011) · Recommender Systems Handbook · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-85820-3_7 · Cited by 1,102 · see citing works
"You Might Also Like:" Privacy Risks of Collaborative Filtering
Calandrino, J. A., Kilzer, A., Narayanan, A., Felten, E. W., & Shmatikov, V. (2011) · 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2011.40 · Cited by 311 · see citing works
GCN-Based User Representation Learning for Unifying Robust Recommendation and Fraudster Detection
Zhang, S., Yin, H., Chen, T., Hung, Q. V. N., Huang, Z., & Cui, L. (2020) · Proceedings of the 43rd International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Development in Information Retrieval · doi:10.1145/3397271.3401165 · Cited by 175 · see citing works
Self-citationPrivacy-Aware Recommendation with Private-Attribute Protection using Adversarial Learning
Beigi, G., Mosallanezhad, A., Guo, R., Alvari, H., Nou, A., & Liu, H. (2020) · Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining · doi:10.1145/3336191.3371832 · Cited by 80 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Liu, H., Wang, Y., Zhang, Z., Deng, J., Chen, C., & Zhang, L. Y. (2024) · Information Processing & Management · doi:10.1016/j.ipm.2024.103720 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Roy, F., Ding, X., Choo, K. K. R., & Zhou, P. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2409.12651
- Authors
- Zhang, S., Yuan, W., & Yin, H.
- Affiliations
- The University of Queensland (AU)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
- Published
- 2024-03
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 987-999
- ISSN
- 1041-4347 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-2191
- 2326-3865
- OpenAlex
- W4384284127
- Cited by
- 97
- References
- 5
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 42 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 1
- FWCI
- 8.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, public-domain)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (public-domain)
- Funders
- Australian Research Council Future Fellowship (FT210100624)
- Discovery Project (DP190101985)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Recommender Systems and Techniques
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
- Keywords
- federated recommender systems, attribute inference attacks, privacy preservation, graph convolutional networks, personalized recommendation, user privacy, recommendation accuracy
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review