Cited by 97Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataRecommender Systems and TechniquesPrivacy, Security, and Data Protection

Comprehensive Privacy Analysis on Federated Recommender System Against Attribute Inference Attacks

Open access
Zhang, Shijie, Yuan, Wei, Yin, Hongzhi·2024·IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering

Abstract

In recent years, recommender systems are crucially important for the delivery of personalized services that satisfy users’ preferences. With personalized recommendation services, users can enjoy a variety of recommendations such as movies, books, ads, restaurants, and more. Despite the great benefits, personalized recommendations typically require the collection of personal data for user modelling and analysis, which can make users susceptible to attribute inference attacks. Specifically, the vulnerability of existing centralized recommenders under attribute inference attacks leaves malicious attackers a backdoor to infer users’ private attributes, as the systems remember information of their training data (i.e., interaction data and side information). An emerging practice is to implement recommender systems in the federated setting, which enables all user devices to collaboratively learn a shared global recommender while keeping all the training data on device. However, the privacy issues in federated recommender systems have been rarely explored. In this paper, we first design a novel attribute inference attacker to perform a comprehensive privacy analysis of the GCN-based federated recommender models. The experimental results show that the vulnerability of each model component against attribute inference attack is varied, highlighting the need for new defense approaches. Therefore, we propose a novel adaptive privacy-preserving approach to protect users’ sensitive data in the presence of attribute inference attacks and meanwhile maximize the recommendation accuracy. Extensive experimental results on two real-world datasets validate the superior performance of our model on both recommendation effectiveness and resistance to inference attacks.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/tkde.2023.3295601

Cites

5 of 5 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Various privacy preservation methodologies, such as randomization, differential privacy, secure multiparty computation, and homomorphic encryption, can be applied to build decentralized PPRS.

    “To address these vulnerabilities, various privacy preservation methodologies, such as randomization, differential privacy, secure multiparty computation, and homomorphic encryption, can be applied to build decentralized PPRS [14, 129-132, 138, 139, 141].”
  • Decentralized recommender systems remain vulnerable to threats such as inference attacks and differential attacks.

    “Although decentralized RS inherently provides a privacy protocol, as users preserve their entire historical data, and even FedRec prioritizes user privacy over DCS, it remains vulnerable to threats such as inference attacks and differential attacks [105, 138-142].”

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Authors
Zhang, S., Yuan, W., & Yin, H.
Affiliations
The University of Queensland (AU)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Published
2024-03
Volume
36
Issue
3
Pages
987-999
ISSN
  • 1041-4347 (ISSN-L)
  • 1558-2191
  • 2326-3865
OpenAlex
W4384284127
Cited by
97
References
5
Citations by year
2026: 19 · 2025: 42 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 1
FWCI
8.50
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, public-domain)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (public-domain)
Funders
  • Australian Research Council Future Fellowship (FT210100624)
  • Discovery Project (DP190101985)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Recommender Systems and Techniques
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
Keywords
federated recommender systems, attribute inference attacks, privacy preservation, graph convolutional networks, personalized recommendation, user privacy, recommendation accuracy

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