A Survey on Autonomy-Induced Security Risks in Large Model-Based Agents
Open accessAbstract
Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have catalyzed the rise of autonomous AI agents capable of perceiving, reasoning, and acting in dynamic, open-ended environments. These large-model agents mark a paradigm shift from static inference systems to interactive, memory-augmented entities. While these capabilities significantly expand the functional scope of AI, they also introduce qualitatively novel security risks-such as memory poisoning, tool misuse, reward hacking, and emergent misalignment-that extend beyond the threat models of conventional systems or standalone LLMs. In this survey, we first examine the structural foundations and key capabilities that underpin increasing levels of agent autonomy, including long-term memory retention, modular tool use, recursive planning, and reflective reasoning. We then analyze the corresponding security vulnerabilities across the agent stack, identifying failure modes such as deferred decision hazards, irreversible tool chains, and deceptive behaviors arising from internal state drift or value misalignment. These risks are traced to architectural fragilities that emerge across perception, cognition, memory, and action modules. To address these challenges, we systematically review recent defense strategies deployed at different autonomy layers, including input sanitization, memory lifecycle control, constrained decision-making, structured tool invocation, and introspective reflection. While these techniques provide partial mitigation, most operate in isolation and lack the integrated coherence required to manage emergent, temporally extended, and cross-module threats. Motivated by these limitations, we introduce the Reflective Risk-Aware Agent Architecture (R2A2)-a unified cognitive framework grounded in Constrained Markov Decision Processes (CMDPs), which incorporates risk-aware world modeling, meta-policy adaptation, and joint reward-risk optimization to enable principled, proactive safety across the agent's decision-making loop. This survey provides a structured understanding of how autonomy reshapes the security landscape of intelligent systems and offers a blueprint for embedding safety as a core design principle in next-generation AI agents.
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Expanded attack surfaces and emergent risky behaviors have been observed in autonomous agent experiments.
“Already, expanded attack surfaces and emergent risky behaviors have been observed in autonomous agent experiments [49,50,51].”
From A Review of Multi-Agent AI Systems for Biological and Clinical Data Analysis (2026) · cites this paper as [51]
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- Authors
- Su, H., Luo, J., Liu, C., Yang, X., Zhang, Y., Dong, Y., & Zhu, J.
- Affiliations
- Tsinghua University (CN)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence
- Published
- 2026-10
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 11382-11401
- ISSN
- 0162-8828 (ISSN-L)
- 2160-9292
- 1939-3539
- OpenAlex
- W4416522837
- Cited by
- 11
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11
- FWCI
- 10.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Funders
- NSFC (92370124)
- Shandong Provincial Natural Science Foundation (ZR2022ZD01)
- Beijing Natural Science Foundation (L247011)
- High Performance Computing Center, Tsinghua University
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Access Control and Trust
- Keywords
- autonomous AI agents, large language models, AI security risks, memory poisoning, tool misuse, reward hacking, emergent misalignment, agent autonomy, long-term memory, reflective thinking, agent safety, constrained Markov decision process, input sanitization, tool invocation
- MeSH terms
- Large Language Models, Artificial Intelligence, Humans, Surveys and Questionnaires, Computer Security
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