Vulnerability Assessment of Cybersecurity for SCADA Systems
Abstract
Vulnerability assessment is a requirement of NERC's cybersecurity standards for electric power systems. The purpose is to study the impact of a cyber attack on supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Compliance of the requirement to meet the standard has become increasingly challenging as the system becomes more dispersed in wide areas. Interdependencies between computer communication system and the physical infrastructure also become more complex as information technologies are further integrated into devices and networks. This paper proposes a vulnerability assessment framework to systematically evaluate the vulnerabilities of SCADA systems at three levels:system,scenarios, andaccesspoints. The proposed method is based on cyber systems embedded with the firewall and password models, the primary mode of protection in the power industry today. The impact of a potential electronic intrusion is evaluated by its potential loss of load in the power system. This capability is enabled by integration of a logic-based simulation method and a module for the power flow computation. The IEEE 30-bus system is used to evaluate the impact of attacks launched from outside or from within the substation networks. Countermeasures are identified for improvement of the cybersecurity.
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An IPS performs the intrusion detection and additionally also attempts to prevent/stop certain incidents.
“An IPS performs the intrusion detection and additionally also attempts to prevent/stop certain incidents [103].”
From Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques (2017) · cites this paper as [103]
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A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems
Kriaa, S., Pietre-Cambacedes, L., Bouissou, M., & Halgand, Y. (2015) · Reliability Engineering & System Safety · doi:10.1016/j.ress.2015.02.008 · Cited by 375 · see citing works
A survey of cyber security management in industrial control systems
Knowles, W., Prince, D., Hutchison, D., Disso, J. F. P., & Jones, K. (2015) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2015.02.002 · Cited by 344 · see citing works
A Survey on SCADA Systems: Secure Protocols, Incidents, Threats and Tactics
Pliatsios, D., Sarigiannidis, P., Lagkas, T., & Sarigiannidis, A. G. (2020) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2020.2987688 · Cited by 320 · see citing works
“Several research works have analyzed and assessed the vulnerabilities of SCADA communication protocols [52], [53], [54], [55], [56].”
BackgroundPower system reliability evaluation with SCADA cybersecurity considerations
Zhang, Y., Wang, L., Xiang, Y., & Ten, C.-W. (2015) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2015.2396994 · Cited by 239 · see citing works
Self-citationAssessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques
Nazir, S., Patel, S., & Patel, D. (2017) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2017.06.010 · Cited by 167 · see citing works
“Linear dynamical models [30] are used to model the behaviour of control systems.”
BackgroundMethodNader, P., Honeine, P., & Beauseroy, P. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2014.2330796 · Cited by 122 · see citing works
Girdhar, M., Hong, J., Lee, H., & Song, T.-J. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2021.3122106 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
AI in Power Systems and Energy Markets
Ramos, C., & Liu, C.-C. (2011) · IEEE Intelligent Systems · doi:10.1109/mis.2011.26 · Cited by 39 · see citing works
Self-citation
- Authors
- Ten, C.-W., Liu, C.-C., & Manimaran, G.
- Affiliations
- Iowa State University (US)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
- Published
- 2008-11
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1836-1846
- ISSN
- 0885-8950 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2041830596
- Cited by
- 583
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 28 · 2022: 36 · 2021: 42 · 2020: 43 · 2019: 49 · 2018: 45 · 2017: 49 · 2016: 45 · 2015: 46 · 2014: 45 · 2013: 26 · 2012: 23
- FWCI
- 25.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Power Systems (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Iowa State University
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power System Optimization and Stability
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Keywords
- SCADA systems, load loss, power flow analysis, cybersecurity countermeasures, IEEE 30-bus system
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