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Smart Grid Data Integrity Attacks
Abstract
Real power injections at loads and generators, and real power flows on selected lines in a transmission network are monitored and transmitted over a SCADA network to the system operator. These are used in state estimation algorithms to make dispatch, re-balance and other energy management system [EMS] decisions. Coordinated cyber attacks on power meter readings can be designed to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm. These unobservable attacks present a serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings. An efficient algorithm to find all unobservable attacks [under standard DC load flow approximations] involving the compromise of exactly two power injection meters and an arbitrary number of power meters on lines is presented. This requires O(n2m) flops for a power system with n buses and m line meters. If all lines are metered, there exist canonical forms that characterize all 3, 4, and 5-sparse unobservable attacks. These can be quickly detected with O(n2) flops using standard graph algorithms. Known-secure phasor measurement units [PMUs] can be used as countermeasures against a given collection of cyber attacks. Finding the minimum number of necessary PMUs is NP-hard. It is shown that p+1 PMUs at carefully chosen buses are sufficient to neutralize a collection of p cyber attacks.
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Citations
Cited by
Survey in Smart Grid and Smart Home Security: Issues, Challenges and Countermeasures
Komninos, N., Philippou, E., & Pitsillides, A. (2014) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2014.2320093 · Cited by 560
False Data Injection on State Estimation in Power Systems—Attacks, Impacts, and Defense: A Survey
Deng, R., Xiao, G., Lu, R., Liang, H., & Vasilakos, A. V. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2016.2614396 · Cited by 553
Cyber-physical systems and their security issues
Alguliyev, R., Imamverdiyev, Y., & Sukhostat, L. (2018) · Computers in Industry · doi:10.1016/j.compind.2018.04.017 · Cited by 472
Secure Control Systems: A Quantitative Risk Management Approach
(2015) · IEEE Control Systems · doi:10.1109/mcs.2014.2364709 · Cited by 316
Bhattarai, B. P., Paudyal, S., Luo, Y., Mohanpurkar, M., Cheung, K., Tonkoski, R., Hovsapian, R., Myers, K. S., Zhang, R., Zhao, P., et al. (2019) · IET Smart Grid · doi:10.1049/iet-stg.2018.0261 · Cited by 292
Metadata
- Authors
- Giani, A., Bitar, E., Garcia, M., McQueen, M., Khargonekar, P., & Poolla, K.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Published
- 2013-09
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1244-1253
- ISSN
- 1949-3053 (ISSN-L)
- 1949-3061
- OpenAlex
- W2079428693
- Cited by
- 236
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 34.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Giani, A., Bitar, E., Garcia, M., McQueen, M., Khargonekar, P., & Poolla, K. (2013). Smart Grid Data Integrity Attacks. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid. https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2013.2245155
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